From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Yasunori Goto <y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
Michael Davidson <md@google.com>,
Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>, Aaron Durbin <adurbin@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Subject: TASK_DEAD && ttwu() again (Was: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL)
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2013 20:19:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130123191946.GA19101@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130121194723.GA18775@redhat.com>
To avoid the confusion, this is not connected to ptrace_freeze_traced()
changes...
With or without these changes, there is another problem: a spurious
wakeup from try_to_wake_up(TASK_NORMAL) which doesn't necessarily see
the "right" task->state.
As for ptrace_stop() this is purely theoretical, but I thought that
perhaps it makes sense to extract the "mb + unlock_wait(pi_lock)" code
from do_exit() into the generic helper,
set_current_state_sync_because_we_cant_tolerate_a_wrong_wakeup().
But when I look at this code again I am not sure it is right.
Let me remind the problem. To oversimplify, we have
try_to_wake_up(task, state)
{
lock(task->pi_lock);
if (task->state & state)
task->state = TASK_RUNNING;
unlock(task->pi_lock);
}
And this means that a task doing
current->state = STATE_1;
// no schedule() in between
current->state = STATE_2;
schedule();
can be actually woken up by try_to_wake_up(STATE_1) even if it already
sleeps in STATE_2.
Usually this is fine, any wait_event-like code should be careful. But
sometimes we can't afford the false wakeup, that is why do_wait() roughly
does
do_exit()
{
// down_read(mmap_sem) can do this without schedule()
current->state = TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
mb();
spin_unlock_wait(current->pi_lock);
current->state = TASK_DEAD;
schedule();
}
This should ensure that any subsequent (after unlock_wait) try_to_wake_up()
can't see state == UNINTERRUPTIBLE and I think this works.
But. Somehow we missed the fact (I think) that we also need to serialize
unlock_wait() and "state = TASK_DEAD". The code above can be reordered,
do_exit()
{
// down_read(mmap_sem) can do this without schedule()
current->state = TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE;
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
mb();
current->state = TASK_DEAD;
// !!! ttwu() can change ->state here !!!
spin_unlock_wait(current->pi_lock);
schedule();
}
and we have the same problem again. So _I think_ that we we need another
mb() after unlock_wait() ?
And, afaics, in theory we can't simply move the current mb() down, after
unlock_wait(). (again, only in theory, if nothing else we should have
the implicit barrrers after we played with ->state in the past).
Or perhaps we should modify ttwu_do_wakeup() to not blindly set RUNNING,
say, cmpxchg(old_state, RUNNING). But this is not simple/nice.
Or I missed something?
Oleg.
--- x/kernel/exit.c
+++ x/kernel/exit.c
@@ -869,8 +869,15 @@ void do_exit(long code)
* To avoid it, we have to wait for releasing tsk->pi_lock which
* is held by try_to_wake_up()
*/
+
smp_mb();
raw_spin_unlock_wait(&tsk->pi_lock);
+ /*
+ * The first mb() ensures that after that try_to_wake_up() must see
+ * state == TASK_RUNNING. We need another one to ensure that we set
+ * TASK_DEAD only after ->pi_lock is really unlocked.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-01-23 19:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20130115172613.GA3011@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <20130116181830.GA6469@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CA+55aFzkWqSEzw9oa5JodrM2NWE0H_AF7xyzRhd+DQ=PB=ZT2A@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20130118153700.GA27915@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CA+55aFxEow_-PoX0xFa07yOi6az=6uVx8zeOsfToErmzh7dB8A@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20130118172854.GA29753@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <20130118175224.GA520@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CA+55aFyEsU-pkX557A-m+xoGkA_v+fXEyA8z8HbJ5J8K1jObeg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20130118185559.GA3773@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CA+55aFy=newnMbx53HipyWbRs2mUUPSqXXCpSfDLW78gkro37g@mail.gmail.com>
2013-01-20 19:24 ` [PATCH 0/4] (Was: ptrace: prevent PTRACE_SETREGS from corrupting stack) Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH 1/4] ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up() Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH 2/4] ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 19:46 ` [PATCH v2 " Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 20:21 ` [PATCH " Linus Torvalds
2013-01-21 17:21 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-21 18:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-01-21 19:47 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-21 19:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up() Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-21 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v4 " Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-21 19:48 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-22 17:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-23 19:19 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2013-01-23 19:50 ` TASK_DEAD && ttwu() again (Was: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL) Tejun Heo
2013-01-24 18:50 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 19:25 ` [PATCH 3/4] ia64: kill thread_matches(), unexport ptrace_check_attach() Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-01-20 19:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-20 19:35 ` [PATCH 0/4] (Was: ptrace: prevent PTRACE_SETREGS from corrupting stack) Oleg Nesterov
2013-01-23 18:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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