From: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
To: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86, x2apic: Only WARN on broken BIOSes inside a virtual guest
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 20:52:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130131185200.GA1757@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1359650435-73586-1-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 11:40:35AM -0500, Don Zickus wrote:
> In commit "41750d3 x86, x2apic: Enable the bios request for x2apic optout"
> it was explained how OEMs are trying to opt out of using x2apics.
>
> That commit moved code around and screamed with a WARN if the BIOS
> opted out of x2apic mode. Fair enough.
>
> This code hit our RHEL distro and OEMs started complaining that the
> WARN is scaring their customers and asked we tone it down to a
> pr_warn().
>
> Before we did that, we thought we should change it upstream too.
> Upstream complained that WARN was necessary due to a serious
> security threat, namely irq injections. Hard to argue that.
>
> This left us between a rock and a hard place. We toned down the
> WARN in RHEL to keep our customers happy. But this leaves us with
> a perpetual patch in RHEL and possibly covering up a security threat.
>
> I poked around to understand the nature of the security threat and why
> OEMs would want to leave themselves vulnerable. The only security
> threat I could find was this whitepaper talking about Xen and irq
> injections:
>
> http://www.invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
>
> After talking with folks, the threat of irq injections on virtual guests
> made sense. However, when discussing if this was possible on bare metal
> machines, we could not come up with a plausible scenario.
>
The irq injections is something that a guest with assigned device does
to attack a hypervisor it runs on. Interrupt remapping protects host
from this attack. According to pdf above if x2apic is disabled in a
hypervisor interrupt remapping can be bypassed and leave host vulnerable
to guest attack. This means that situation is exactly opposite: warning
has sense on a bare metal, but not in a guest. I am not sure that there is
a hypervisor that emulates interrupt remapping device though and without
it the warning cannot be triggered in a guest.
--
Gleb.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-01-31 18:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-01-31 16:40 [PATCH] x86, x2apic: Only WARN on broken BIOSes inside a virtual guest Don Zickus
2013-01-31 18:52 ` Gleb Natapov [this message]
2013-01-31 19:34 ` Don Zickus
2013-01-31 20:00 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-01-31 20:52 ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-01 22:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-01 22:57 ` [PATCH] intel_irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic optout security warning mess Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-03 19:29 ` [tip:x86/apic] x86/intel/irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic opt-out " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-04 18:20 ` [PATCH] intel_irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic optout " Don Zickus
2013-02-04 19:04 ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-04 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-02-04 19:39 ` Alex Williamson
2013-02-04 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
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