public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/6][v3] ima: Support a mode to appraise signed files only
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 16:44:45 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130214214445.GI16671@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1360875084.3524.695.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com>

On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 03:51:24PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2013-02-14 at 14:55 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Hi,
> > 
> > Currently ima appraises all the files as specified by the rule.
> 
> Currently IMA appraises files based on policy.

And policy is composed of multiple rules. Ok, will change it.

> 
> >  So
> > if one wants to create a system where only few executables are
> > signed, that system will not work with IMA.
> 
> This statement misrepresents the IMA policy.  You can definitely define
> a policy that only measures/appraises a few specific files. In your
> usecase scenario, you are not willing to rely on LSM labels.  Policy
> rules can also be based on file owner.  We could also add support for
> gid.

Ok, will change it. How about following.

We want to create a system where only few executables are signed. This
patch extends IMA policy syntax so that one can specify that signatures
are optional.

> 
> > With secureboot, one needs to disable kexec so that unsigned kernels
> > can't be booted. To avoid this problem, it was proposed that sign
> > /sbin/kexec binary and if signatures are verified successfully, give
> > an special capability to the /sbin/kexec process. And in secureboot
> > mode processes with that special capability can invoke sys_kexec()
> > system call.
> 
> Please add here that you then rely on /sbin/kexec to verify the
> integrity of the kernel image.

Ok, will do that. This is infact a grey area. Yet to be figured out
how /sbin/kexec will ensure a signed kernel is being loaded.

Thanks
Vivek

      reply	other threads:[~2013-02-14 21:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-02-14 19:55 [RFC PATCH 0/6][v3] ima: Support a mode to appraise signed files only Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 1/6] ima: detect security xattrs not enabled Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima: Return INTEGRITY_FAIL if digital signature can't be verified Vivek Goyal
2013-03-04 13:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-04 16:20     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-05 13:30       ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-05 13:54         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-05 15:35         ` Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/evm: Differentiate between ima/evm nolabel return code Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Introduce new integrity error code INTEGRITY_XATTR_NOTSUPP Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: Allow appraisal of digitally signed files only Vivek Goyal
2013-03-05 19:13   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-07  7:44     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: With appraise_type=optional, audit log some messages as info Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 20:51 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6][v3] ima: Support a mode to appraise signed files only Mimi Zohar
2013-02-14 21:44   ` Vivek Goyal [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20130214214445.GI16671@redhat.com \
    --to=vgoyal@redhat.com \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox