Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

Stephen Rothwell
2013-03-18T02:12:36Z

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Hi Linus,

On Thu, 21 Feb 2013 10:56:44 -0800 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:25:47AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> - why do you bother with the MS keysigning of Linux kernel modules to
> >> begin with?
> >
> > This is not actually what the patchset implements. All it's done here
> > is using PE files as envelopes for keys. The usage this enables is to
> > allow for whoever makes a module (binary only or merely out of tree for
> > whatever reason) to sign it and vouch for it themselves. That could
> > include, for example, a systemtap module.
>
> Umm. And which part of "We already support that, using standard X.509
> certificates" did we suddenly miss?
>
> So no. The PE file thing makes no sense what-so-ever. What you mention
> we can already do, and we already do it *better*.

So, is this enough close enough to "I will never take this" for me to
remove it from linux-next, or could further discussion persuade you?

David, if I do remove it, are there other patches in your pekey tree that
are still going forward?

I ask because the pekey tree is interacting with other trees and it does
not make sense to have those interactions in linux-next if the pekey work
is never going upstream.
--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell sfr@canb.auug.org.au

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