Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

Matthew Garrett
2013-02-28T23:47:51Z

On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:45:23AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be
> > infected. There's not really any good way around that.
>
> Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust,
> isn't it?

If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later
revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until
it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here?

--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org