From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1760175Ab3B0PYq (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:24:46 -0500 Received: from li9-11.members.linode.com ([67.18.176.11]:50258 "EHLO imap.thunk.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1759999Ab3B0PYp (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:24:45 -0500 Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:24:29 -0500 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: Peter Jones Cc: Dave Airlie , Greg KH , Matthew Garrett , David Howells , Florian Weimer , Linus Torvalds , Josh Boyer , Vivek Goyal , Kees Cook , keyrings@linux-nfs.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries Message-ID: <20130227152429.GA5609@thunk.org> Mail-Followup-To: Theodore Ts'o , Peter Jones , Dave Airlie , Greg KH , Matthew Garrett , David Howells , Florian Weimer , Linus Torvalds , Josh Boyer , Vivek Goyal , Kees Cook , keyrings@linux-nfs.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List References: <20130226030249.GB23834@kroah.com> <20130226031338.GA29784@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226033156.GA24999@kroah.com> <20130226033803.GA30285@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226035416.GA1128@kroah.com> <20130226040456.GA30717@srcf.ucam.org> <20130226041324.GA7241@kroah.com> <20130226044521.GC12906@thunk.org> <20130226165451.GE32160@fenchurch.internal.datastacks.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20130226165451.GE32160@fenchurch.internal.datastacks.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: tytso@thunk.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on imap.thunk.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:54:51AM -0500, Peter Jones wrote: > No, no, no. Quit saying nobody knows. We've got a pretty good idea - > we've got a contract with them, and it says they provide the signing > service, and under circumstances where the thing being signed is found > to enable malware that circumvents Secure Boot The question is what does "malware that circuments Secure Boot" mean? Does starting up a hacked KVM and running Windows 8 under KVM so that malare can be injected count as circumenting Secure Boot? If so, will you have to disable KVM, too? What if someone implements a virtualization bootkit for Windows 8. Will they revoke their own key? Somehow, I doubt that.... - Ted