From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757797Ab3B1XFb (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2013 18:05:31 -0500 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([93.93.128.6]:57742 "EHLO cavan.codon.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757061Ab3B1XF0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2013 18:05:26 -0500 Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2013 23:05:19 +0000 From: Matthew Garrett To: Jiri Kosina Cc: David Howells , Linus Torvalds , jwboyer@redhat.com, pjones@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Greg KH , Florian Weimer , Paolo Bonzini Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries Message-ID: <20130228230518.GA12717@srcf.ucam.org> References: <30665.1361461678@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20130228225115.GA12360@srcf.ucam.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mjg59@cavan.codon.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cavan.codon.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:02:43AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote: > But the real harm is being done by the i_own_your_ring0.ko module, which > can be modprobed on all the systems where the signed "hello world" binary > has been keyctl-ed before it was blacklisted. Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be infected. There's not really any good way around that. > In other words -- you blacklist the population of the key on systems by > blakclisting the key-carrying binary, but the key remains trusted on > whatever system the binary has been processed by keyctl before. Right? You have to re-load it on every boot, it's not a permanent thing. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org