From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] ima: Return INTEGRITY_FAIL if digital signature can't be verified
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2013 10:35:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130305153554.GC4519@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1362490253.4392.159.camel@falcor1>
On Tue, Mar 05, 2013 at 08:30:53AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-03-04 at 11:20 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 04, 2013 at 08:48:36AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2013-02-14 at 14:55 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > > Digital signature verification happens using integrity_digsig_verify().
> > > > Curently we set integrity to FAIL for all error codes except -EOPNOTSUPP.
> > > > This sounds out of line.
> > > >
> > > > - If appropriate kernel code is not compiled in to verify signature of
> > > > a file, then prractically it is a failed signature.
> > > >
> > > > - For so many other possible errors we are setting the status to fail.
> > > > For example, -EINVAL, -ENOKEY, -ENOMEM, -EINVAL, -ENOTSUPP etc, it
> > > > beats me that why -EOPNOTSUPP is special.
> > > >
> > > > This patch should make the semantics more consistent. That is, if digital
> > > > signature is present in security.ima, then any error happened during
> > > > signature processing leads to status INTEGRITY_FAIL.
> > > >
> > > > AFAICS, it should not have any user visible effect on existing
> > > > application. In some cases we will start returning INTEGRITY_FAIL
> > > > instead of INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. And process_measurement() will deny access
> > > > to file both in case of INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN and INTEGRITY_FAIL.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > >
> > > A number of patches in this patchset more finely differentiate return
> > > codes, which is good. I agree with you totally that there is no good
> > > reason for -EOPNOTSUPP to be handled differently. Unfortunately, the
> > > initramfs is CPIO, which doesn't support xattrs. With the proposed
> > > change and 'ima_appraise_tcb' flag enabled, we wouldn't be able to boot.
> > > I really dislike hard coding policy in the kernel.
> >
> > Hi Mimi,
> >
> > If there are no xattr, then we will not even hit this code. We will
> > bail out early in vfs_getxattr_alloc().
> >
> > I thought that one of the DON_APPRAISE rules will kick in for initramfs
> > and files in initramfs will not be appraised and boot will continue.
> >
> > {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> >
> > Is that not the case here?
>
> Right, thanks for the clarification. Perhaps we could abbreviate the
> patch description like:
>
> Digital signature verification happens using integrity_digsig_verify().
> If a digital signature is present in security.ima, then any error, which
> happens during signature verification, should lead to status
> INTEGRITY_FAIL. In the future we might want to differentiate between
> persistent (eg. -ENOMEM) vs. non-persistent errors, in order to cache
> failures. This patch removes the unnecessary -EOPNOTSUPP test.
Sure. I will modify the changelog for future posting.
Thanks
Vivek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-05 15:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-02-14 19:55 [RFC PATCH 0/6][v3] ima: Support a mode to appraise signed files only Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 1/6] ima: detect security xattrs not enabled Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima: Return INTEGRITY_FAIL if digital signature can't be verified Vivek Goyal
2013-03-04 13:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-04 16:20 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-05 13:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-05 13:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-05 15:35 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/evm: Differentiate between ima/evm nolabel return code Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Introduce new integrity error code INTEGRITY_XATTR_NOTSUPP Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: Allow appraisal of digitally signed files only Vivek Goyal
2013-03-05 19:13 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-07 7:44 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-02-14 19:55 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: With appraise_type=optional, audit log some messages as info Vivek Goyal
2013-02-14 20:51 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6][v3] ima: Support a mode to appraise signed files only Mimi Zohar
2013-02-14 21:44 ` Vivek Goyal
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