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From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: Stupid VFS name lookup interface..
Date: Sun, 26 May 2013 08:02:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130526120251.GA32729@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51A1040A.80003@schaufler-ca.com>

On Sat, May 25, 2013 at 11:33:46AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Now I'll put on my Smack maintainer hat. Performance improvement is
> always welcome, but I would rather see attention to performance of
> the LSM architecture than SELinux specific hacks. The LSM blob
> pointer scheme is there so that you (Linus) don't have to see the
> dreadful things that we security people are doing. Is it time to
> get past that level of disassociation? Or, and I really hate asking
> this, have you fallen into the SELinux camp?

What part of the LSM architecture are you proposing be optimized?  The
LSM layer is pretty thin, partially because the various different
security approaches don't agree with each other on fairly fundamental
issues.  What sort of optimization opportunities you are suggesting?
Are there changes that can be made that all of the major security LSM
maintainers would actually agree with?

I've been re-reading the thread on LKML which was spawned when SMACK
was proposed for upstream inclusion:

    http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/585903/focus=586412

Have any of the arguments over the proper security models changed over
or have gotten resolved over the past six years, while I haven't been
looking?

						- Ted

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-05-26 12:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-05-21 22:22 Stupid VFS name lookup interface Linus Torvalds
2013-05-21 22:34 ` Al Viro
2013-05-21 22:37   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-25  3:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-25 16:57   ` Al Viro
2013-05-25 17:26     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-25 18:33     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-26  3:22       ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-26  5:04         ` James Morris
2013-05-26  5:19           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-26 17:59             ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-26 18:17               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-26 18:41                 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-30  1:28             ` Eric Paris
2013-05-30  3:05               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-26 12:02       ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2013-05-26 18:23         ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-26 19:11           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-05-26 19:32             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-05-28 16:26               ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-29  0:17         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2013-05-26  5:03     ` James Morris

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