* [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce exec_binprm() for "depth == 0" code
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: kill "int depth" in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (6 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
task_pid_nr_ns() and trace/ptrace code in the middle of the
recursive search_binary_handler() looks confusing and imho
annoying. We only need this code if "depth == 0", lets add
a simple helper which calls search_binary_handler() and does
trace_sched_process_exec() + ptrace_event().
The patch also moves the setting of task->did_exec, we need
to do this only once.
Note: we can kill either task->did_exec or PF_FORKNOEXEC.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 9c73def..a9ae4f2 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1373,7 +1373,6 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
unsigned int depth = bprm->recursion_depth;
int try,retval;
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
- pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
if (depth > 5)
@@ -1387,12 +1386,6 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (retval)
return retval;
- /* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
- old_pid = current->pid;
- rcu_read_lock();
- old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
retval = -ENOENT;
for (try=0; try<2; try++) {
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
@@ -1407,16 +1400,11 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
retval = fn(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth = depth;
if (retval >= 0) {
- if (depth == 0) {
- trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
- ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
- }
put_binfmt(fmt);
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
if (bprm->file)
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
- current->did_exec = 1;
proc_exec_connector(current);
return retval;
}
@@ -1450,9 +1438,29 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
return retval;
}
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
+static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
+ old_pid = current->pid;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
+ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
+ current->did_exec = 1;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* sys_execve() executes a new program.
*/
@@ -1541,7 +1549,7 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
- retval = search_binary_handler(bprm);
+ retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: kill "int depth" in search_binary_handler()
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce exec_binprm() for "depth == 0" code Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: proc_exec_connector() should be called only once Oleg Nesterov
` (5 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
Nobody except search_binary_handler() should touch ->recursion_depth,
"int depth" buys nothing but complicates the code, kill it.
Probably we should also kill "fn" and the !NULL check, ->load_binary
should be always defined. And it can not go away after read_unlock()
or this code is buggy anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 9 ++++-----
include/linux/binfmts.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a9ae4f2..f32079c 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1370,12 +1370,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
*/
int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- unsigned int depth = bprm->recursion_depth;
- int try,retval;
+ int try, retval;
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
- if (depth > 5)
+ if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
return -ELOOP;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
@@ -1396,9 +1395,9 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- bprm->recursion_depth = depth + 1;
+ bprm->recursion_depth++;
retval = fn(bprm);
- bprm->recursion_depth = depth;
+ bprm->recursion_depth--;
if (retval >= 0) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index 70cf138..e8112ae 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ struct linux_binprm {
#ifdef __alpha__
unsigned int taso:1;
#endif
- unsigned int recursion_depth;
+ unsigned int recursion_depth; /* only for search_binary_handler() */
struct file * file;
struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */
int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: proc_exec_connector() should be called only once
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce exec_binprm() for "depth == 0" code Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: kill "int depth" in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: move allow_write_access/fput to exec_binprm() Oleg Nesterov
` (4 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
A separate one-liner with the minor fix.
PROC_EVENT_EXEC reports the "exec" event, but this message
is sent at least twice if search_binary_handler() is called
by ->load_binary() recursively, say, load_script().
Move it to exec_binprm(), this is "depth == 0" code too.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index f32079c..ad7d624 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1404,7 +1404,6 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->file)
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
- proc_exec_connector(current);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
@@ -1455,6 +1454,7 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
current->did_exec = 1;
+ proc_exec_connector(current);
}
return ret;
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: move allow_write_access/fput to exec_binprm()
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: proc_exec_connector() should be called only once Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: kill ->load_binary != NULL check in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (3 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
When search_binary_handler() succeeds it does allow_write_access()
and fput(), then it clears bprm->file to ensure the caller will not
do the same.
We can simply move this code to exec_binprm() which is called only
once. In fact we could move this to free_bprm() and remove the same
code in do_execve_common's error path.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++----
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ad7d624..577e98b 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1400,10 +1400,6 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->recursion_depth--;
if (retval >= 0) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
- allow_write_access(bprm->file);
- if (bprm->file)
- fput(bprm->file);
- bprm->file = NULL;
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
@@ -1455,6 +1451,12 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
current->did_exec = 1;
proc_exec_connector(current);
+
+ if (bprm->file) {
+ allow_write_access(bprm->file);
+ fput(bprm->file);
+ bprm->file = NULL; /* to catch use-after-free */
+ }
}
return ret;
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: kill ->load_binary != NULL check in search_binary_handler()
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: move allow_write_access/fput to exec_binprm() Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: cleanup the CONFIG_MODULES logic Oleg Nesterov
` (2 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
search_binary_handler() checks ->load_binary != NULL for no reason,
this method should be always defined. Turn this check into WARN_ON()
and move it into __register_binfmt().
Also, kill the function pointer. The current code looks confusing,
as if ->load_binary can go away after read_unlock(&binfmt_lock).
But we rely on module_get(fmt->module), this fmt can't be changed
or unregistered, otherwise this code is buggy anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 7 +++----
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 577e98b..f0112f9 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt, int insert)
{
BUG_ON(!fmt);
+ if (WARN_ON(!fmt->load_binary))
+ return;
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
insert ? list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats) :
list_add_tail(&fmt->lh, &formats);
@@ -1389,14 +1391,11 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
for (try=0; try<2; try++) {
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
- int (*fn)(struct linux_binprm *) = fmt->load_binary;
- if (!fn)
- continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
bprm->recursion_depth++;
- retval = fn(bprm);
+ retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth--;
if (retval >= 0) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: cleanup the CONFIG_MODULES logic
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] exec: kill ->load_binary != NULL check in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: don't retry if request_module() fails Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: cleanup the error handling in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
search_binary_handler() uses "for (try=0; try<2; try++)" to avoid
"goto" but the code looks too complicated and horrible imho. We
still need to check "try == 0" before request_module() and add the
additional "break" for !CONFIG_MODULES case.
Kill this loop and use a simple "bool need_retry" + "goto retry".
The code looks much simpler and we do not even need ifdef's, gcc
can optimize out the "if (need_retry)" block if !IS_ENABLED().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------
1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index f0112f9..f69cf54 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1367,13 +1367,15 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
+#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
/*
* cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
*/
int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int try, retval;
+ bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
+ int retval;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
@@ -1388,47 +1390,39 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return retval;
retval = -ENOENT;
- for (try=0; try<2; try++) {
- read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
- if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
- continue;
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- bprm->recursion_depth++;
- retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
- bprm->recursion_depth--;
- if (retval >= 0) {
- put_binfmt(fmt);
- return retval;
- }
- read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+ retry:
+ read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
+ if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
+ continue;
+ read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+ bprm->recursion_depth++;
+ retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
+ bprm->recursion_depth--;
+ if (retval >= 0) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
- if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL)
- break;
- if (!bprm->file) {
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- return retval;
- }
+ return retval;
}
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
- if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL) {
+ read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
+ put_binfmt(fmt);
+ if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL)
break;
- } else {
-#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
- if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) &&
- printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
- printable(bprm->buf[2]) &&
- printable(bprm->buf[3]))
- break; /* -ENOEXEC */
- if (try)
- break; /* -ENOEXEC */
- request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(unsigned short *)(&bprm->buf[2]));
+ if (!bprm->file) {
+ read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+ return retval;
}
-#else
- break;
-#endif
}
+ read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
+
+ if (need_retry && retval == -ENOEXEC && bprm->mm) {
+ if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
+ printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
+ return retval;
+ request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2));
+ need_retry = false;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+
return retval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: don't retry if request_module() fails
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: cleanup the CONFIG_MODULES logic Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: cleanup the error handling in search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
A separate one-liner for better documentation.
It doesn't make sense to retry if request_module() fails to exec
/sbin/modprobe, add the additional "request_module() < 0" check.
However, this logic still doesn't look exactly right:
1. It would be better to check "request_module() != 0", the user
space modprobe process should report the correct exit code.
But I didn't dare to add the user-visible change.
2. The whole ENOEXEC logic looks suboptimal. Suppose that we try
to exec a "#!path-to-unsupported-binary" script. In this case
request_module() + "retry" will be done twice: first by the
"depth == 1" code, and then again by the "depth == 0" caller
which doesn't make sense.
3. And note that in the case above bprm->buf was already changed
by load_script()->prepare_binprm(), so this looks even more
ugly.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index f69cf54..682895d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1418,7 +1418,8 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
return retval;
- request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2));
+ if (request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2)) < 0)
+ return retval;
need_retry = false;
goto retry;
}
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: cleanup the error handling in search_binary_handler()
2013-08-05 13:41 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: cleanup search_binary_handler() Oleg Nesterov
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2013-08-05 13:41 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: don't retry if request_module() fails Oleg Nesterov
@ 2013-08-05 13:41 ` Oleg Nesterov
7 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2013-08-05 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Al Viro, Evgeniy Polyakov, Kees Cook, Zach Levis, linux-kernel
The error hanling and ret-from-loop look confusing and inconsistent.
- "retval >= 0" simply returns
- "!bprm->file" returns too but with read_unlock() because
binfmt_lock was already re-acquired
- "retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL" does "break" and
relies on the same check after the main loop
Consolidate these checks into a single if/return statement.
need_retry still checks "retval == -ENOEXEC", but this and -ENOENT
before the main loop are not needed. This is only for pathological
and impossible list_empty(&formats) case.
It is not clear why do we check "bprm->mm == NULL", probably this
should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 11 +++--------
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 682895d..eb2f05a 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1399,22 +1399,17 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->recursion_depth++;
retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth--;
- if (retval >= 0) {
+ if (retval >= 0 || retval != -ENOEXEC ||
+ bprm->mm == NULL || bprm->file == NULL) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
- if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL)
- break;
- if (!bprm->file) {
- read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- return retval;
- }
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
- if (need_retry && retval == -ENOEXEC && bprm->mm) {
+ if (need_retry && retval == -ENOEXEC) {
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
return retval;
--
1.5.5.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread