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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops
Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 23:24:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130824212432.GA9299@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130824182939.GA23630@redhat.com>

Hi Oleg,

On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 08:29:39PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> Sorry for off-topic, I am just curios.
> 
> On 08/22, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> >
> > It's not only that, it also supports sockets and pipes that you can access
> > via /proc/pid/fd and not via a real symlink which would try to open eg
> > "pipe:[23456]" instead of the real file.
> 
> But sock_no_open() disallows this, and for good reason I guess.

Hmmm not exactly, it works for a pipe but not for a socket. It even
breaks /dev/stdin (/proc/self/fd/0) for processes running attached
to a socket (eg: shell script) :

sh-3.1$ ls -la /proc/$$/fd/
total 0
dr-x------ 2 willy users  0 Aug 24 23:03 .
dr-xr-xr-x 6 willy users  0 Aug 24 23:03 ..
lrwx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:03 0 -> socket:[1247293]
lrwx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:03 1 -> socket:[1247293]
lrwx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:03 2 -> socket:[1247293]
lrwx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:03 255 -> socket:[1247293]
sh-3.1$ read < /dev/stdin
sh: /dev/stdin: No such device or address
sh-3.1$ read < /dev/fd/0
sh: /dev/fd/0: No such device or address

But :

window 1:
  willy@pcw:~$ ssh 0 sh -i
  sh-3.1$ echo $$
  9832
  sh-3.1$ ls -la /proc/$$/fd/
  total 0
  dr-x------ 2 willy users  0 Aug 24 23:16 .
  dr-xr-xr-x 6 willy users  0 Aug 24 23:16 ..
  lr-x------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:16 0 -> pipe:[1247914]
  l-wx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:16 1 -> pipe:[1247915]
  l-wx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:16 2 -> pipe:[1247916]
  l-wx------ 1 willy users 64 Aug 24 23:17 255 -> pipe:[1247916]
  sh-3.1$ 

window 2:
  willy@pcw:~$ echo hello > /proc/9832/fd/1
  willy@pcw:~$ echo whoami > /proc/9832/fd/0

window 1:
  sh-3.1$ hello
  willy
  sh-3.1$ 

> I am wondering, perhaps anon_inode should do the same? I do not
> see any problem, but it looks pointless and misleading to allow
> to open a file you can do nothing with.

I don't know, I'm often a bit confused by entries in /proc/pid/fd
because I don't always know which ones might safely be used or not.

> Or is there any reason why, say, open("anon_inode:[perf_event]")
> should succeed?

I doubt it. It seems to me that most such entries are implemented
for completeness while most valid uses only concern /proc/self/fd.
Maybe if we had an option so that only /proc/self/fd would actually
allow to access the fds while all /proc/pid/fd would only show what
they map to, it would be a good step forward.

> Thanks,
> 
> Oleg.
> 
> --- x/fs/anon_inodes.c
> +++ x/fs/anon_inodes.c
> @@ -24,7 +24,15 @@
>  
>  static struct vfsmount *anon_inode_mnt __read_mostly;
>  static struct inode *anon_inode_inode;
> -static const struct file_operations anon_inode_fops;
> +
> +static int anon_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> +	return -ENXIO;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations anon_inode_fops = {
> +	.open = anon_open,
> +};
>  
>  /*
>   * anon_inodefs_dname() is called from d_path().

regards,
willy


  reply	other threads:[~2013-08-24 21:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-21 19:14 [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Andy Lutomirski
     [not found] ` <CA+55aFxi-ps2f2M8xPhfbuQ0pToqupPrDsLi2+GPUK2sqdYfUw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CALCETrW7+LcexA6v6RQDKhni_yJAduOmiSDneCpq3v8sPDvwUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-21 20:16     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 18:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 18:53   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 19:05     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 19:23       ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:15           ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-22 20:22             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:44               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:48                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-22 20:54                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-22 20:58                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-23  1:07                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  3:37                       ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  7:26                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 14:23                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 17:04                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-25 19:57                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 20:06                           ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 20:23                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 17:37                               ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:07                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 18:11                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:16                                   ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add user_file_or_path_at and use it for truncate Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 19:32                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 20:28                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28  6:16                                         ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 16:24                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-28 19:04                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-28 19:59                                             ` Al Viro
2013-08-28 21:07                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-27 23:08                                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 23:13                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-08-24 18:29             ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-24 21:24               ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2013-08-25  5:23                 ` Al Viro
2013-08-25  6:50                   ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-25 18:51                     ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:48                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 20:05                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 15:33                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 16:37                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 17:54                               ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:09                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 19:35                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-26 20:20                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2013-08-27 15:05                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:39                                     ` [PATCH 0/1] proc: make /proc/self point to thread Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 14:40                                       ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 16:39                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 17:49                                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-27 18:15                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2013-08-27 18:28                                               ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]                                     ` <CALCETrXP-mYBPRon=0NzexW1FK1Qxz2+Bwv7-WeHBQpvW7ywRg@mail.gmail.com>
2013-08-27 15:45                                       ` [PATCH] proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:32                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 18:46                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 18:56                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-26 19:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-27 14:53                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 18:32                   ` /proc/pid/fd && anon_inode_fops Linus Torvalds
2013-08-25 19:11                     ` Al Viro
2013-08-25 19:17                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-09-03 15:58                     ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 15:45                 ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]               ` <20130825051044.GY27005@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
     [not found]                 ` <20130825155348.GB25922@redhat.com>
     [not found]                   ` <CALCETrXrtP2C+g=QeNWK4EMctmonW91kWoO1xmy7rDmEj__1Dw@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                     ` <20130825174936.GA30957@redhat.com>
2013-08-25 17:55                       ` [PATCH 0/1] anon_inodefs: forbid open via /proc Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-25 17:55                         ` [PATCH 1/1] " Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-22 19:39       ` [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) Willy Tarreau

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