From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 10:11:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130829091127.GA2635@dztty> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87sixt735b.fsf@xmission.com>
Hi Eric,
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 05:26:56PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> I have take a moment and read this thread, and have been completely
> unenlightend. People are upset but it is totally unclear why.
>
> There is no explanation why it is ok to ignore the suid-exec case, as
> the posted patches do. Which ultimately means the patches provide
Please, did you take a look at the patches ?
- INF("syscall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+ INF("syscall", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
Can you please tell me how did you come to the conclusion that the
patches "ignore the suid-exec case as the posted patches do" ?
I just did s/0444/0400/ which is pretty obvious and did not remove
that ptrace check at read() added by Al.
> little to no security benefit, and that the posted patches as written
> are broken.
They are correct. Perhaps you didn't take a closer look
Thanks Eric
--
Djalal Harouni
http://opendz.org
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-29 9:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-26 16:23 [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:24 ` [PATCH 2/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/pagemap Djalal Harouni
2013-08-26 16:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 16:49 ` [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-26 17:20 ` Al Viro
2013-08-27 17:24 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-28 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 21:11 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-08-29 0:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29 1:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 3:33 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-29 7:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 9:11 ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2013-08-29 22:14 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-31 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-09-01 1:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-01 15:04 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-12 1:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 0:41 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-04 0:53 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-08-26 20:34 ` Djalal Harouni
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