Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>]

Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> 
> As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
> properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
> permission in the user namespace.
> 
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---
>  security/commoncap.c |    2 +-
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>   */
>  static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
>  {
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
> +	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	if (!cap_valid(cap))
>  		return -EINVAL;
> -- 
> 1.7.5.4