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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: proc hidepid=2 and SGID programs
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2013 15:42:02 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130919114202.GA12144@cachalot> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eb1060ff-d56d-42b7-89f5-a459820edb82@email.android.com>

On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 01:58 -0700, Christian Kujau wrote:
> Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> >> But still, I wonder if this is 
> >> intended behaviour.
> >
> >Yes.
> >
> >If you think such side channel attacks are something you don't care,
> >just turn hidepid off.  That's why it is an option.
> >
> >If you want to turn it off for some users, use gid=XXX.
> 
> Maybe my initial question got lost in the noise: I merely wondered why "pgrep sgid-program" returned nothing but "kill pics off stiff program" was possible. Sure, if that's intended behavior, so be it. I just don't understand the (technical) reasoning behind this.

If process A may ptrace process B, A may kill B.  In this case A may see
any information about B.

If process A may not ptrace process B, A probably still may kill B.  But
A may not see any information about B.

In sense of information gathering hidepid doesn't differ setgid'ed
processes and common processes of another user.  As *some* privileges
differ between a subject and an object, they are considered as being in
different security domains.  Information leakage crossing the
interdomain border between these domains might help an attacker, so it
is denied.

-- 
Vasily Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

      parent reply	other threads:[~2013-09-19 11:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-07  8:51 proc hidepid=2 and SGID programs Christian Kujau
2013-09-09  6:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-10  8:30   ` Christian Kujau
2013-09-10 10:00     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-09-14 11:14     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2013-09-15  8:58       ` Christian Kujau
2013-09-15  9:01         ` Christian Kujau
2013-09-19 11:42         ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]

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