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From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	joern@logfs.org, macro@linux-mips.org, ralf@linux-mips.org,
	dave.taht@gmail.com, blogic@openwrt.org, andrewmcgr@gmail.com,
	smueller@chronox.de, geert@linux-m68k.org, tg@mirbsd.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 10/12] random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 17:40:39 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130922214039.GC7321@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e665f20c-9154-4dbd-bb93-cf144922bf29@email.android.com>

On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 02:21:48PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> Is this really an improvement on a system with plenty of entropy? Would it not make more sense to modulate this bad on entropy production rates?
> 
> Also, the urandom pool is only reseeded once per read, no matter how large...

I added this after observing using the random driver's tracepoints to
measure how the entropy pool behaves on a desktop system.  It turns
outs the Chrome browser requests a truly amazing amount of entropy
using /dev/urandom.  Enough so that while you are reading GMail or
using G+, the available entropy in the input pool is always running at
minimum levels.  (i.e., it never gets above 192 bits before we do a
catatrophic reseed and it drops down to 128 bits.)

I'm not sure what the heck it is doing --- maybe it is using
/dev/urandom to generate random padding values?  I can't believe it is
opening new SSL connetions that quickly.  So this might be a Chrome
bug, and I can talk to some Chrome developers when I get into work
tomorrow.  But in the case of badly behaved applications, this is
useful.

It results in more entropy building up in the input pool before we do
a reseed, so it should result in better "catastrophic reseeding", and
it means that there is more entropy available in the input pool for
use by the /dev/random pool, even if /dev/urandom is being used in
what might be arguably considered an abusive fashion.

You can test this by applying the patch, and observing the value of
/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail over time while running a Chrome
browser (and there may be other userspace applications which are as
aggressive in the use of /dev/urandom).  The compare it after running
the command "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/random/urandom_min_reseed_secs",
which will restore the original pre-patch behaviour.

						- Ted

  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-22 21:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-22 20:38 [PATCH, RFC 00/12] random driver changes Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/12] random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/12] random: Statically compute poolbitshift, poolbytes, poolbits Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/12] random: Allow fractional bits to be tracked Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/12] random: Account for entropy loss due to overwrites Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/12] random: fix the tracepoint for get_random_bytes(_arch) Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/12] random: optimize spinlock use in add_device_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/12] random: allow architectures to optionally define random_get_entropy() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23 10:38   ` Stephan Mueller
2013-09-23 11:05     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/12] random: mix in architectural randomness earlier in extract_buf() Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  4:11   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-23  4:33     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/12] random: optimize the entropy_store structure Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/12] random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 21:21   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 21:40     ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2013-09-22 22:45       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 23:23         ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-23  0:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/12] random: speed up the fast_mix function by a factor of four Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-22 20:38 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/12] random: adjust the generator polynomials in the mixing function slightly Theodore Ts'o
2013-09-25 10:51   ` Jörg-Volker Peetz

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