From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 14:30:27 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131017112806.GA5293@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1310171858170.32257@tundra.namei.org>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 07:02:17PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> This seems like a regression in terms of separating mechanism and policy.
>
> We have several access control systems available (SELinux, at least) which
> can implement this functionality with existing mechanisms using dynamic
> policy.
>
> I'm concerned about the long term architectural impact of a proliferation
> of arbitrary hard-coded security policies in the kernel. I don't
> understand the push in this direction, frankly.
The biggest risk in LSM stacker is really to become backdoor for very product
dilated kernel changes that are not accepted to the mainline kernel. I think
having LSM stacker would be benefical but barrier should be set very high
for "one-shot" modules.
One big benefit that I see in LSM stacker is not at least directly security
related. It would be perfect integration tool when you want for example
provide Android run-time in an OS that uses AppArmor or SMACK as its security
framework.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-17 11:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-20 20:35 [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions Kees Cook
2013-09-24 1:24 ` James Morris
2013-09-24 1:28 ` James Morris
2013-09-24 1:45 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 20:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 21:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2013-10-03 21:36 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-23 2:55 ` Lucas De Marchi
2013-10-16 15:18 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-16 20:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
2013-10-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-10-16 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-17 0:37 ` Tetsuo Handa
2013-10-26 13:51 ` Tetsuo Handa
2013-11-02 19:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-10-18 2:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-10-17 8:02 ` James Morris
2013-10-17 11:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2013-10-17 21:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-17 17:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-10-17 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-23 0:02 ` James Morris
2013-10-23 1:03 ` Casey Schaufler
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