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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>, Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>,
	Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] check_unsafe_exec: kill the dead -EAGAIN and clear_in_exec logic
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2013 18:54:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131122175442.GA31453@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131122175424.GA31432@redhat.com>

fs_struct->in_exec == T means that this ->fs is used by a single
process (thread group), and one of the treads does do_execve().

To avoid the mt-exec races this code has the following complications:

	1. check_unsafe_exec() returns -EBUSY if ->in_exec was
	   already set by another thread.

	2. do_execve_common() records "clear_in_exec" to ensure
	   that the error path can only clear ->in_exec if it was
	   set by current.

However, after 9b1bf12d5d51 "signals: move cred_guard_mutex from
task_struct to signal_struct" we do not need these complications:

	1. We can't race with our sub-thread, this is called under
	   per-process ->cred_guard_mutex. And we can't race with
	   another CLONE_FS task, we already checked that this fs
	   is not shared.

	   We can remove the  dead -EAGAIN logic.

	2. "out_unmark:" in do_execve_common() is either called
	   under ->cred_guard_mutex, or after de_thread() which
	   kills other threads, so we can't race with sub-thread
	   which could set ->in_exec. And if ->fs is shared with
	   another process ->in_exec should be false anyway.

	   We can clear in_exec unconditionally.

This also means that check_unsafe_exec() can be void.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
---
 fs/exec.c |   29 ++++++++---------------------
 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 0cd9c25..60eb5c5 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1225,11 +1225,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
  * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
  *   PTRACE_ATTACH
  */
-static int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
 	unsigned n_fs;
-	int res = 0;
 
 	if (p->ptrace) {
 		if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)
@@ -1255,22 +1254,15 @@ static int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
+	if (p->fs->users > n_fs)
 		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
-	} else {
-		res = -EAGAIN;
-		if (!p->fs->in_exec) {
-			p->fs->in_exec = 1;
-			res = 1;
-		}
-	}
+	else
+		p->fs->in_exec = 1;
 	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
-
-	return res;
 }
 
-/* 
- * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. 
+/*
+ * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
  * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
  *
  * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).
@@ -1461,7 +1453,6 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
 	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
 	struct file *file;
 	struct files_struct *displaced;
-	bool clear_in_exec;
 	int retval;
 
 	/*
@@ -1493,10 +1484,7 @@ static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
 	if (retval)
 		goto out_free;
 
-	retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto out_free;
-	clear_in_exec = retval;
+	check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
 	current->in_execve = 1;
 
 	file = open_exec(filename);
@@ -1565,8 +1553,7 @@ out_file:
 	}
 
 out_unmark:
-	if (clear_in_exec)
-		current->fs->in_exec = 0;
+	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 
 out_free:
-- 
1.5.5.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-11-22 17:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-11-22 17:54 [PATCH 0/4] in_exec/etc cleanups Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 17:54 ` [PATCH 1/4] check_unsafe_exec: use while_each_thread() rather than next_thread() Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 19:42   ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-22 20:24     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 20:32       ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-22 17:54 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2013-11-22 20:27   ` [PATCH 2/4] check_unsafe_exec: kill the dead -EAGAIN and clear_in_exec logic KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-22 20:49     ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 21:00       ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-23 15:32         ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 17:54 ` [PATCH 3/4] exec: move the final allow_write_access/fput into free_bprm() Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 20:29   ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-23 19:22   ` Kees Cook
2013-11-22 17:54 ` [PATCH 4/4] kill task_struct->did_exec Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 19:46   ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2013-11-22 20:33     ` [PATCH v2 " Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-22 20:33       ` KOSAKI Motohiro

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