From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759089Ab3LBVGz (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Dec 2013 16:06:55 -0500 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:38395 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753033Ab3LBTNP (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Dec 2013 14:13:15 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Seppanen , Nicholas Bellinger Subject: [PATCH 3.10 050/173] iscsi-target: chap auth shouldnt match username with trailing garbage Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2013 11:10:33 -0800 Message-Id: <20131202191148.404413034@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.4.3.gca3854a In-Reply-To: <20131202191142.873808297@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20131202191142.873808297@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.60-8.1.3 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Seppanen commit 86784c6bdeeef78eed94d298be7a8879f6a97ee2 upstream. In iSCSI negotiations with initiator CHAP enabled, usernames with trailing garbage are permitted, because the string comparison only checks the strlen of the configured username. e.g. "usernameXXXXX" will be permitted to match "username". Just check one more byte so the trailing null char is also matched. Signed-off-by: Eric Seppanen Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( unsigned char client_digest[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; unsigned char server_digest[MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; unsigned char chap_n[MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE], chap_r[MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH]; + size_t compare_len; struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol; struct crypto_hash *tfm; struct hash_desc desc; @@ -186,7 +187,9 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( goto out; } - if (memcmp(chap_n, auth->userid, strlen(auth->userid)) != 0) { + /* Include the terminating NULL in the compare */ + compare_len = strlen(auth->userid) + 1; + if (strncmp(chap_n, auth->userid, compare_len) != 0) { pr_err("CHAP_N values do not match!\n"); goto out; }