public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: linuxnfs <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Question about nfs4_destroy_session()
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 14:07:53 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140212220753.GG4250@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5BCC49E0-6F92-49EC-BFCD-17D5CA4D30C7@primarydata.com>

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 04:55:02PM -0500, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> 
> On Feb 12, 2014, at 16:42, Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hello, Trond,
> > 
> > In nfs4_destroy_session(), there is an rcu_dereference() that looks to
> > leak the returned pointer out of an RCU read-side critical section.
> > If the pointed-to object might have just now been created, this is a
> > bug because xprt_destroy_backchannel() dereferences this pointer.
> > 
> > So, does xprt_destroy_backchannel() exclude creation-side code?  (If so,
> > no bug -- but a comment might be good.)
> > 
> > 							Thanx, Paul
> > 
> > void nfs4_destroy_session(struct nfs4_session *session)
> > {
> > 	struct rpc_xprt *xprt;
> > 	struct rpc_cred *cred;
> > 
> > 	cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(session->clp);
> > 	nfs4_proc_destroy_session(session, cred);
> > 	if (cred)
> > 		put_rpccred(cred);
> > 
> > 	rcu_read_lock();
> > 	xprt = rcu_dereference(session->clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_xprt);
> > 	rcu_read_unlock();
> > 	dprintk("%s Destroy backchannel for xprt %p\n",
> > 		__func__, xprt);
> > 	xprt_destroy_backchannel(xprt, NFS41_BC_MIN_CALLBACKS);
> > 	nfs4_destroy_session_slot_tables(session);
> > 	kfree(session);
> > }
> > 
> 
> Hi Paul,
> 
> nfs4_destroy_session() is only called when we’re tearing down the struct nfs_client that owns the cl_rppcclient, and the associated cl_xprt, so the code above should be safe, despite being ugly.
> 
> Is there a better annotation for use in the above kind of situation?

One approach would be to add a comment on the rcu_dereference() stating
that creation-side code is excluded, e.g., via locking or by the data
structures no longer being accessible.  Another approach would be to
move the rcu_read_unlock() to follow the xprt_destroy_backchannel(),
assuming none of the code that would be pulled into the RCU read-side
critical section can block.

The second approach would prevent false positives from the RCU pointer
leak detectors that are being worked on.

							Thanx, Paul


      reply	other threads:[~2014-02-12 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-12 21:42 Question about nfs4_destroy_session() Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-12 21:55 ` Trond Myklebust
2014-02-12 22:07   ` Paul E. McKenney [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20140212220753.GG4250@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --to=paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=trond.myklebust@primarydata.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox