Re: ioctl CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE is checked in the wrong namespace

Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30T00:24:23Z

On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 5:21 PM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@amacapital.net):
>> > It should be a nonissue so long as we make sure that a file owned by a
>> > uid outside the scope of the container may not be changed even though
>> > fs_owner_uid is set. Otherwise, it's just a matter of chmod +S on say
>> > a shell and anyone who can see the fs from the host will be getting a
>> > root shell (assuming said file is owned by the host's uid 0).
>>
>> I feel like that's too fragile. I'd rather add a rule that one of
>
> yeah I don't wnat to rush something like that. I'd rather stash
> the userns of the task which did the mounting and check against
> that. Note that would make it worthless unless and until we allowed
> mounting from non-init userns, but then we can only claim "our fs
> superblock readers suck and therefore containers can't mount an fs"
> so long before we start to feel some shame and audit them...
>
>> these filesystems always acts like it's nosuid unless you're inside a
>> user namespace that matches fs_owner_uid.
>>
>> Maybe even that is too weird. How about setuid, setgid, and fcaps
>> only work on mounts that are in mount namespaces that are owned by the
>> current user namespace or one of its parents? IOW, a struct mount is
>> only trusted if mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns == current user ns or one of its
>> parents?
>>
>> Untrusted mounts would act like they are nosuid,nodev. Someone can
>> try to figure out a safe way to relax nodev at some point.

Do you like this variant? We could add a way for global root to mount
an fs on behalf of a userns. I'd rather this be more explicit than
just mounting it in a mount ns owned by the user namespace, though.

--Andy