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From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"Linux Containers" <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	lxc-devel <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: Re: ioctl CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE is checked in the wrong namespace
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 00:44:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140430004453.GD28969@ubuntumail> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVh0hCtiK=9fmEYfUWuz4C1dPq22kvyd=OWFMH5pXGaZw@mail.gmail.com>

Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@amacapital.net):
> On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 5:21 PM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> wrote:
> > Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@amacapital.net):
> >> > It should be a nonissue so long as we make sure that a file owned by a
> >> > uid outside the scope of the container may not be changed even though
> >> > fs_owner_uid is set. Otherwise, it's just a matter of chmod +S on say
> >> > a shell and anyone who can see the fs from the host will be getting a
> >> > root shell (assuming said file is owned by the host's uid 0).
> >>
> >> I feel like that's too fragile.  I'd rather add a rule that one of
> >
> > yeah I don't wnat to rush something like that.  I'd rather stash
> > the userns of the task which did the mounting and check against
> > that.  Note that would make it worthless unless and until we allowed
> > mounting from non-init userns, but then we can only claim "our fs
> > superblock readers suck and therefore containers can't mount an fs"
> > so long before we start to feel some shame and audit them...
> >
> >> these filesystems always acts like it's nosuid unless you're inside a
> >> user namespace that matches fs_owner_uid.
> >>
> >> Maybe even that is too weird.  How about setuid, setgid, and fcaps
> >> only work on mounts that are in mount namespaces that are owned by the
> >> current user namespace or one of its parents?  IOW, a struct mount is
> >> only trusted if mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns == current user ns or one of its
> >> parents?
> >>
> >> Untrusted mounts would act like they are nosuid,nodev.  Someone can
> >> try to figure out a safe way to relax nodev at some point.
> 
> Do you like this variant?  We could add a way for global root to mount
> an fs on behalf of a userns.  I'd rather this be more explicit than
> just mounting it in a mount ns owned by the user namespace, though.

I'm missing something.  Which mnt are you talking about?  A user
can just clone a new userns and then clone(CLONE_NEWNS) to get a set
of mounts owned by himself...  We need to get a mnt (or a cred or
straight to a userns) tied to the first mount of the superblock, istm.

-serge

  reply	other threads:[~2014-04-30  0:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-29 13:49 ioctl CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE is checked in the wrong namespace Marian Marinov
2014-04-29 18:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-29 18:52   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-29 21:49     ` Marian Marinov
2014-04-29 22:02       ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-29 22:24         ` Marian Marinov
2014-04-29 22:29           ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-29 22:45             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-29 23:06               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-29 23:07                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-29 23:20               ` Marian Marinov
2014-04-29 23:22                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-29 23:47                   ` Stéphane Graber
2014-04-29 23:51                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:01                       ` Stéphane Graber
2014-04-30  0:10                         ` Marian Marinov
2014-04-30  0:12                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:11                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:21                           ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-30  0:23                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:44                               ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2014-04-30  1:03                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:16               ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-30  0:32                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-30  0:33                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-30  0:40                   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-04-30  7:48                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-04-30 13:33                     ` Serge Hallyn

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