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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 19:26:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140603172632.GA27956@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140603130233.658a6a3c@gandalf.local.home>

On 06/03, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>
> We were able to trigger this bug in -rt, and by review, I'm thinking
> that this could very well be a mainline bug too. I had our QA team add
> a trace patch to the kernel to prove my analysis, and it did.
>
> Here's the patch:
>
>  http://rostedt.homelinux.com/private/sighand-trace.patch
>
> Let me try to explain the bug:
>
>
> 	CPU0				CPU1
> 	----				----
>  [ read of /proc/<pid>/stat ]
>   get_task_struct();
>   [...]
> 				  [ <pid> exits ]
> 				  [ parent does wait on <pid> ]
> 				  wait_task_zombie()
> 				    release_task()
> 				      proc_flush_task()
> 				      /* the above removes new access
> 				         to the /proc system */
> 				      __exit_signal()
> 				        __cleanup_sighand(sighand);
> 					  atomic_dec_and_test(sighand->count);
>   do_task_stat()
>     lock_task_sighand(task);
>       sighand = rcu_dereference(tsk->sighand);
>
> 					    kmem_cache_free(sighand);
>
>       if (sighand != NULL)
>         spin_lock(sighand->siglock);
>
>        ** BOOM! use after free **

Yes, ->sighand can be already freed at this point, but this should be
fine because sighand_cachep is SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU.

That is why lock_task_sighand() does rcu_read_lock() and re-checks
sighand == tsk->sighand after it takes ->siglock. It is fine if it was
already freed or even reallocated via kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep).
We only need to ensure that (SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU should ensure this)
this memory won't be returned to system, so this peace of memory must
be "struct sighand" with the properly initialized ->siglock until
rcu_read_unlock().

> Seems there is no protection between reading the sighand from proc and
> freeing it. The sighand->count is not updated, and the sighand is not
> freed via rcu.

See above.

> One, the spinlock in -rt is an rtmutex. The list_del_entry() bug is the
> task trying to remove itself from sighand->lock->wait_list. As the lock
> has been freed, the list head of the rtmutex is corrupted.

looks like, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU logic is broken?

Oleg.


  reply	other threads:[~2014-06-03 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-03 17:02 [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 17:26 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2014-06-03 18:03   ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-03 20:01     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-03 20:03       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-06 20:33       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-08 13:07         ` safety of *mutex_unlock() (Was: [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc) Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-09 16:26           ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-09 18:15             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-09 18:29               ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-09 18:51                 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-09 19:41                   ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-10  8:53                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 16:57                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10 18:08                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 18:13                           ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-10 20:05                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 20:13                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-11 15:52                                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-11 17:07                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:17                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:29                                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-11 17:59                                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 19:56                                           ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 17:28                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-12 20:35                                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 21:40                                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-12 22:27                                                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 23:19                                                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-13 15:08                                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-15  5:40                                                         ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-17 18:57                                                           ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-18 16:43                                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-18 16:53                                                               ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-21 19:54                                                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-18 17:00                                                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-13 14:55                                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-13 16:10                                                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-13 16:19                                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-13 14:52                                                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:27                                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 17:07                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10 17:51                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 12:56                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 14:48                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 15:18                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 15:35                     ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 16:15                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-09 19:04                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10  8:37             ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 12:52               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 13:01                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 14:36                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 15:20                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-03 20:05     ` [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 20:09       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-03 20:15         ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 20:25         ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 21:12           ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-03 18:05   ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 19:25     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-04  1:16       ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-04 16:31         ` Oleg Nesterov

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