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From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: safety of *mutex_unlock() (Was: [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc)
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 09:26:13 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140609162613.GE4581@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140608130718.GA11129@redhat.com>

On Sun, Jun 08, 2014 at 03:07:18PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 06/06, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 03, 2014 at 10:01:25PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > >
> > > I'll try to recheck rt_mutex_unlock() tomorrow. _Perhaps_ rcu_read_unlock()
> > > should be shifted from lock_task_sighand() to unlock_task_sighand() to
> > > ensure that rt_mutex_unlock() does nothihg with this memory after it
> > > makes another lock/unlock possible.
> > >
> > > But if we need this (currently I do not think so), this doesn't depend on
> > > SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU. And, at first glance, in this case rcu_read_unlock_special()
> > > might be wrong too.
> >
> > OK, I will bite...  What did I mess up in rcu_read_unlock_special()?
> >
> > This function does not report leaving the RCU read-side critical section
> > until after its call to rt_mutex_unlock() has returned, so any RCU
> > read-side critical sections in rt_mutex_unlock() will be respected.
> 
> Sorry for confusion.
> 
> I only meant that afaics rcu_read_unlock_special() equally depends on the
> fact that rt_mutex_unlock() does nothing with "struct rt_mutex" after it
> makes another rt_mutex_lock() + rt_mutex_unlock() possible, otherwise this
> code is wrong (and unlock_task_sighand() would be wrong too).
> 
> Just to simplify the discussion... suppose we add "atomic_t nr_slow_unlock"
> into "struct rt_mutex" and change rt_mutex_slowunlock() to do
> atomic_inc(&lock->nr_slow_unlock) after it drops ->wait_lock. Of course this
> would be ugly, just for illustration.

That would indeed be a bad thing, as it could potentially lead to
use-after-free bugs.  Though one could argue that any code that resulted
in use-after-free would be quite aggressive.  But still...

> In this case atomic_inc() above can write to rcu_boost()'s stack after this
> functions returns to the caller. And unlock_task_sighand() would be wrong
> too, atomic_inc() could write to the memory which was already returned to
> system because "unlock" path runs outside of rcu-protected section.
> 
> But it seems to me that currently we are safe, rt_mutex_unlock() doesn't do
> something like this, a concurrent rt_mutex_lock() must always take wait_lock
> too.
> 
> 
> And while this is off-topic and I can be easily wrong, it seems that the
> normal "struct mutex" is not safe in this respect. If nothing else, once
> __mutex_unlock_common_slowpath()->__mutex_slowpath_needs_to_unlock() sets
> lock->count = 1, a concurent mutex_lock() can take and then release this
> mutex before __mutex_unlock_common_slowpath() takes ->wait_lock.
> 
> So _perhaps_ we should not rely on this property of rt_mutex "too much".

Well, I could easily move the rt_mutex from rcu_boost()'s stack to the
rcu_node structure, if that would help.  That said, I still have my
use-after-free concern above.

							Thanx, Paul


  reply	other threads:[~2014-06-09 16:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-03 17:02 [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 17:26 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-03 18:03   ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-03 20:01     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-03 20:03       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-06 20:33       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-08 13:07         ` safety of *mutex_unlock() (Was: [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc) Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-09 16:26           ` Paul E. McKenney [this message]
2014-06-09 18:15             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-09 18:29               ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-09 18:51                 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-09 19:41                   ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-10  8:53                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 16:57                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10 18:08                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 18:13                           ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-10 20:05                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 20:13                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-11 15:52                                 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-11 17:07                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:17                                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:29                                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-11 17:59                                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 19:56                                           ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 17:28                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-12 20:35                                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 21:40                                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-12 22:27                                                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-12 23:19                                                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-13 15:08                                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-15  5:40                                                         ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-17 18:57                                                           ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-18 16:43                                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-18 16:53                                                               ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-21 19:54                                                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-18 17:00                                                               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-13 14:55                                                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-13 16:10                                                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-13 16:19                                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-13 14:52                                                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-11 17:27                                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 17:07                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10 17:51                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-10 12:56                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 14:48                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 15:18                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 15:35                     ` Linus Torvalds
2014-06-10 16:15                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-09 19:04                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-10  8:37             ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 12:52               ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 13:01                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-06-10 14:36                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-10 15:20                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-06-03 20:05     ` [BUG] signal: sighand unprotected when accessed by /proc Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 20:09       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-03 20:15         ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 20:25         ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 21:12           ` Thomas Gleixner
2014-06-03 18:05   ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-03 19:25     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-04  1:16       ` Steven Rostedt
2014-06-04 16:31         ` Oleg Nesterov

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