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From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>,
	Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
	Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Greg Price <price@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: check for increase of entropy_count because of signed conversion
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 17:50:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140718215054.GD18775@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140718212504.GC18775@thunk.org>

On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 05:25:04PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > As indicated by credit_entropy_bits entropy_count cannot get negative,
> > so I don't see any reason to include a check for entropy_count < 0
> > here. Do you agree?
> 
> No, the check is important; after we subtract ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT
> + 3) we could drive entropy_count negative, and we don't want to
> trigger the WARN_ON().
> 
> I'll modify the patch to keep the check.

Never mind, I took a closer look at the your patch, and I now
understand what you were asking.  Since entropy_count should never
_start_ negative, simply checking to see if entropy_count > nfrac is
sufficient.

However, there's something a bit larger hiding here, which is we
shouldn't allow urandom_read to be passed a which is greater than
INT_MAX >> ENTROPY_SHIFT.  Otherwise, the nfrac calcuation will
overflow, which can also result in too little entropy getting removed.

The other problem is that comparing since entropy_count is an int, and
nfrac is a size_t, this is a signed vs. unsigned comparison, which
will raise compiler warnings.  

Let me know what you think of my revised patch, which should hopefully
add enough checks to be sufficiently paranoid.  :-)

							- Ted

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-18 21:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-05-12 15:42 perf: use after free in perf_remove_from_context Sasha Levin
2014-05-14 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-14 16:32   ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-14 16:35     ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-14 16:38       ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-14 16:52         ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-14 17:09           ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-14 17:20             ` Dave Jones
2014-05-14 18:37               ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-28 23:52       ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-29  2:31         ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-29  7:59           ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-29  7:57         ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-29 14:47           ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-29 15:07             ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-29 16:44               ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-29 16:50                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-29 16:52                   ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-29 17:00                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-29 22:37                     ` Sasha Levin
2014-06-05 14:38                     ` [tip:perf/core] perf: Fix use after free in perf_remove_from_context() tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-15 18:11 ` eventpoll __list_del_entry corruption (was: perf: use after free in perf_remove_from_context) Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-15 18:16   ` eventpoll __list_del_entry corruption Sasha Levin
2014-06-16  9:44     ` Eric Wong
2014-05-21  8:25   ` BUG at /usr/src/linux-2.6/mm/filemap.c:202 (was: perf: use after free in perf_remove_from_context) Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-21 13:02     ` BUG at /usr/src/linux-2.6/mm/filemap.c:202 Sasha Levin
2014-06-03 15:07   ` eventpoll __list_del_entry corruption Jason Baron
2014-06-03 15:11     ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-16 15:34 ` BUG_ON drivers/char/random.c:986 (Was: perf: use after free in perf_remove_from_context) Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-16 16:06   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-05-16 16:21     ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-05-17  0:46       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-05-17  2:18         ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-05-17 16:24           ` Sasha Levin
2014-05-17 17:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-07-15  4:36           ` BUG_ON drivers/char/random.c:986 Dave Jones
2014-07-15 20:29             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-16  8:33               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-16 19:18                 ` [PATCH] random: check for increase of entropy_count because of signed conversion Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-18 21:25                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-18 21:43                     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-18 21:50                     ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2014-07-18 22:07                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-18 23:35                         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-19  5:42                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-19  6:20                             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa

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