From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 3.4 01/19] crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2014 11:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140805182934.067023133@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140805182934.022406678@linuxfoundation.org>
3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
commit 4c63f83c2c2e16a13ce274ee678e28246bd33645 upstream.
Th AF_ALG socket was missing a security label (e.g. SELinux)
which means that socket was in "unlabeled" state.
This was recently demonstrated in the cryptsetup package
(cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later.)
See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1115120
This patch clones the sock's label from the parent sock
and resolves the issue (similar to AF_BLUETOOTH protocol family).
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
crypto/af_alg.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
struct alg_type_list {
const struct af_alg_type *type;
@@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ int af_alg_accept(struct sock *sk, struc
sock_init_data(newsock, sk2);
sock_graft(sk2, newsock);
+ security_sk_clone(sk, sk2);
err = type->accept(ask->private, sk2);
if (err) {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-08-05 18:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-08-05 18:29 [PATCH 3.4 00/19] 3.4.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 02/19] ARM: 8115/1: LPAE: reduce damage caused by idmap to virtual memory layout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 03/19] scsi: handle flush errors properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 04/19] mm, thp: do not allow thp faults to avoid cpuset restrictions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 05/19] printk: rename printk_sched to printk_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 06/19] timer: Fix lock inversion between hrtimer_bases.lock and scheduler locks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 07/19] Revert "x86-64, modify_ldt: Make support for 16-bit segments a runtime option" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 08/19] x86-64, espfix: Dont leak bits 31:16 of %esp returning to 16-bit stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 09/19] x86, espfix: Move espfix definitions into a separate header file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 10/19] x86, espfix: Fix broken header guard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 11/19] x86, espfix: Make espfix64 a Kconfig option, fix UML Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 12/19] x86, espfix: Make it possible to disable 16-bit support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 13/19] x86_64/entry/xen: Do not invoke espfix64 on Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 14/19] Revert: "net: ip, ipv6: handle gso skbs in forwarding path" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 15/19] net/l2tp: dont fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 16/19] lib/btree.c: fix leak of whole btree nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 17/19] x86/espfix/xen: Fix allocation of pages for paravirt page tables Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 18/19] mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-05 18:29 ` [PATCH 3.4 19/19] ipv6: reallocate addrconf router for ipv6 address when lo device up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-08-06 8:03 ` chenweilong
2014-08-05 23:08 ` [PATCH 3.4 00/19] 3.4.102-stable review Shuah Khan
2014-08-06 2:33 ` Guenter Roeck
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