[PATCH 3.4 00/23] 3.4.103-stable review

[PATCH 3.4 00/23] 3.4.103-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.103 release.
There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun Aug 10 21:33:01 UTC 2014.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.103-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 3.4.103-rc1

Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>
    arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c: drop stray break operator

Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
    sparc64: ldc_connect() should not return EINVAL when handshake is in progress.

Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
    sunsab: Fix detection of BREAK on sunsab serial console

Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
    bbc-i2c: Fix BBC I2C envctrl on SunBlade 2000

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Guard against flushing openfirmware mappings.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Do not insert non-valid PTEs into the TSB hash table.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Add membar to Niagara2 memcpy code.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Fix huge TSB mapping on pre-UltraSPARC-III cpus.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Don't bark so loudly about 32-bit tasks generating 64-bit fault addresses.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Fix top-level fault handling bugs.

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Handle 32-bit tasks properly in compute_effective_address().

Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>
    sparc64: Make itc_sync_lock raw

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    sparc64: Fix argument sign extension for compat_sys_futex().

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()

Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
    iovec: make sure the caller actually wants anything in memcpy_fromiovecend

Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
    net: Correctly set segment mac_len in skb_segment().

Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
    macvlan: Initialize vlan_features to turn on offload support.

Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
    net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions

Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
    tcp: Fix integer-overflow in TCP vegas

Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
    tcp: Fix integer-overflows in TCP veno

Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
    net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ip: make IP identifiers less predictable

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                             |   4 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h  |   6 ++-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h |  12 +----
 arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c              |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c           |   6 +--
 arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S            |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/unaligned_64.c     |  12 +++--
 arch/sparc/lib/NG2memcpy.S           |   1 +
 arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c        |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c             | 102 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c              |  27 ++++++++++
 arch/sparc/mm/tsb.c                  |  14 ++++-
 drivers/net/macvlan.c                |   1 +
 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c               |   2 +-
 drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c      |   6 +++
 drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c          |  11 ++--
 drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c          |   9 ++++
 include/net/inetpeer.h               |  14 +----
 include/net/ip.h                     |  31 +++++------
 include/net/ipip.h                   |   2 +-
 include/net/ipv6.h                   |   9 +++-
 include/net/secure_seq.h             |   2 -
 net/compat.c                         |   9 ++--
 net/core/iovec.c                     |  10 ++--
 net/core/secure_seq.c                |  23 --------
 net/core/skbuff.c                    |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/igmp.c                      |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c                  |  18 -------
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c                 |   7 ++-
 net/ipv4/ipmr.c                      |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/raw.c                       |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/route.c                     |  78 +++++++++++++++------------
 net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c                 |   3 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c                  |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c         |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                |  25 ++++-----
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c      |   2 +-
 net/sctp/associola.c                 |   1 +
 net/sctp/output.c                    |   2 +-
 39 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-)

[PATCH 3.4 01/23] inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]

Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.

linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.

1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes

2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
   with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.

3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
   is about 20.

4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
   not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
   the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())

5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.

IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'

Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.

We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.

ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)

secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.

Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c          |    2 -
 include/net/inetpeer.h          |   14 +---------
 include/net/ip.h                |   40 ++++++++++++++++------------
 include/net/ipip.h              |    2 -
 include/net/ipv6.h              |    9 +++++-
 include/net/secure_seq.h        |    2 -
 net/core/secure_seq.c           |   23 ----------------
 net/ipv4/igmp.c                 |    4 +-
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c             |   18 ------------
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c            |    7 ++---
 net/ipv4/ipmr.c                 |    2 -
 net/ipv4/raw.c                  |    2 -
 net/ipv4/route.c                |   56 +++++++++++++---------------------------
 net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c    |    2 -
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c           |   23 ++++++----------
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c |    2 -
 16 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 137 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel
 	nf_reset(skb);
 
 	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 	ip_send_check(iph);
 
 	ip_local_out(skb);
--- a/include/net/inetpeer.h
+++ b/include/net/inetpeer.h
@@ -46,13 +46,12 @@ struct inet_peer {
 	};
 	/*
 	 * Once inet_peer is queued for deletion (refcnt == -1), following fields
-	 * are not available: rid, ip_id_count, tcp_ts, tcp_ts_stamp
+	 * are not available: rid, tcp_ts, tcp_ts_stamp
 	 * We can share memory with rcu_head to help keep inet_peer small.
 	 */
 	union {
 		struct {
 			atomic_t			rid;		/* Frag reception counter */
-			atomic_t			ip_id_count;	/* IP ID for the next packet */
 			__u32				tcp_ts;
 			__u32				tcp_ts_stamp;
 		};
@@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ extern bool inet_peer_xrlim_allow(struct
 extern void inetpeer_invalidate_tree(int family);
 
 /*
- * temporary check to make sure we dont access rid, ip_id_count, tcp_ts,
+ * temporary check to make sure we dont access rid, tcp_ts,
  * tcp_ts_stamp if no refcount is taken on inet_peer
  */
 static inline void inet_peer_refcheck(const struct inet_peer *p)
@@ -110,13 +109,4 @@ static inline void inet_peer_refcheck(co
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&p->refcnt) <= 0);
 }
 
-
-/* can be called with or without local BH being disabled */
-static inline int inet_getid(struct inet_peer *p, int more)
-{
-	more++;
-	inet_peer_refcheck(p);
-	return atomic_add_return(more, &p->ip_id_count) - more;
-}
-
 #endif /* _NET_INETPEER_H */
--- a/include/net/ip.h
+++ b/include/net/ip.h
@@ -264,9 +264,19 @@ int ip_dont_fragment(struct sock *sk, st
 		 !(dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU)));
 }
 
-extern void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, int more);
+#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
+extern atomic_t *ip_idents;
 
-static inline void ip_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk)
+static inline u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
+{
+	atomic_t *id_ptr = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
+
+	return atomic_add_return(segs, id_ptr) - segs;
+}
+
+void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs);
+
+static inline void ip_select_ident_segs(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, int segs)
 {
 	struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
 
@@ -276,24 +286,20 @@ static inline void ip_select_ident(struc
 		 * does not change, they drop every other packet in
 		 * a TCP stream using header compression.
 		 */
-		iph->id = (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) ?
-					htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id++) : 0;
-	} else
-		__ip_select_ident(iph, dst, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void ip_select_ident_more(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, int more)
-{
-	struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-
-	if ((iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) && !skb->local_df) {
 		if (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) {
 			iph->id = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id);
-			inet_sk(sk)->inet_id += 1 + more;
-		} else
+			inet_sk(sk)->inet_id += segs;
+		} else {
 			iph->id = 0;
-	} else
-		__ip_select_ident(iph, dst, more);
+		}
+	} else {
+		__ip_select_ident(iph, segs);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void ip_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	ip_select_ident_segs(skb, sk, 1);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/include/net/ipip.h
+++ b/include/net/ipip.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry {
 	int pkt_len = skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb);		\
 									\
 	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;					\
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);				\
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);				\
 									\
 	err = ip_local_out(skb);					\
 	if (likely(net_xmit_eval(err) == 0)) {				\
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -392,14 +392,19 @@ void ip6_frag_init(struct inet_frag_queu
 int ip6_frag_match(struct inet_frag_queue *q, void *a);
 
 /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */
-static inline u32 ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a)
+static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval)
 {
 	u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1];
 
 	return jhash_3words(v,
 			    (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2],
 			    (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3],
-			    ipv6_hash_secret);
+			    initval);
+}
+
+static inline u32 ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a)
+{
+	return __ipv6_addr_jhash(a, ipv6_hash_secret);
 }
 
 static inline int ipv6_addr_any(const struct in6_addr *a)
--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
-extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
 extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
 extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 				      __be16 dport);
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -79,29 +79,6 @@ u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __b
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INET
-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
-{
-	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
-
-	hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
-	hash[1] = net_secret[13];
-	hash[2] = net_secret[14];
-	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
-
-	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
-
-	return hash[0];
-}
-
-__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
-{
-	__u32 hash[4];
-
-	memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
-	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
-
-	return hash[0];
-}
 
 __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
 				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st
 	pip->saddr    = fl4.saddr;
 	pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP;
 	pip->tot_len  = 0;	/* filled in later */
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 	((u8*)&pip[1])[0] = IPOPT_RA;
 	((u8*)&pip[1])[1] = 4;
 	((u8*)&pip[1])[2] = 0;
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_de
 	iph->daddr    = dst;
 	iph->saddr    = fl4.saddr;
 	iph->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP;
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 	((u8*)&iph[1])[0] = IPOPT_RA;
 	((u8*)&iph[1])[1] = 4;
 	((u8*)&iph[1])[2] = 0;
--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
@@ -26,20 +26,7 @@
  *  Theory of operations.
  *  We keep one entry for each peer IP address.  The nodes contains long-living
  *  information about the peer which doesn't depend on routes.
- *  At this moment this information consists only of ID field for the next
- *  outgoing IP packet.  This field is incremented with each packet as encoded
- *  in inet_getid() function (include/net/inetpeer.h).
- *  At the moment of writing this notes identifier of IP packets is generated
- *  to be unpredictable using this code only for packets subjected
- *  (actually or potentially) to defragmentation.  I.e. DF packets less than
- *  PMTU in size when local fragmentation is disabled use a constant ID and do
- *  not use this code (see ip_select_ident() in include/net/ip.h).
  *
- *  Route cache entries hold references to our nodes.
- *  New cache entries get references via lookup by destination IP address in
- *  the avl tree.  The reference is grabbed only when it's needed i.e. only
- *  when we try to output IP packet which needs an unpredictable ID (see
- *  __ip_select_ident() in net/ipv4/route.c).
  *  Nodes are removed only when reference counter goes to 0.
  *  When it's happened the node may be removed when a sufficient amount of
  *  time has been passed since its last use.  The less-recently-used entry can
@@ -62,7 +49,6 @@
  *		refcnt: atomically against modifications on other CPU;
  *		   usually under some other lock to prevent node disappearing
  *		daddr: unchangeable
- *		ip_id_count: atomic value (no lock needed)
  */
 
 static struct kmem_cache *peer_cachep __read_mostly;
@@ -488,10 +474,6 @@ relookup:
 		p->daddr = *daddr;
 		atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
 		atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
-		atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count,
-				(daddr->family == AF_INET) ?
-					secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4) :
-					secure_ipv6_id(daddr->addr.a6));
 		p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
 		p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
 		p->rate_tokens = 0;
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int ip_build_and_send_pkt(struct sk_buff
 	iph->daddr    = (opt && opt->opt.srr ? opt->opt.faddr : daddr);
 	iph->saddr    = saddr;
 	iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, sk);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, sk);
 
 	if (opt && opt->opt.optlen) {
 		iph->ihl += opt->opt.optlen>>2;
@@ -403,8 +403,7 @@ packet_routed:
 		ip_options_build(skb, &inet_opt->opt, inet->inet_daddr, rt, 0);
 	}
 
-	ip_select_ident_more(skb, &rt->dst, sk,
-			     (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1) - 1);
+	ip_select_ident_segs(skb, sk, skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1);
 
 	skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
 	skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
@@ -1347,7 +1346,7 @@ struct sk_buff *__ip_make_skb(struct soc
 	iph->ihl = 5;
 	iph->tos = inet->tos;
 	iph->frag_off = df;
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, sk);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, sk);
 	iph->ttl = ttl;
 	iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
 	ip_copy_addrs(iph, fl4);
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -1576,7 +1576,7 @@ static void ip_encap(struct sk_buff *skb
 	iph->protocol	=	IPPROTO_IPIP;
 	iph->ihl	=	5;
 	iph->tot_len	=	htons(skb->len);
-	ip_select_ident(skb, skb_dst(skb), NULL);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 	ip_send_check(iph);
 
 	memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt));
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *
 		iph->check   = 0;
 		iph->tot_len = htons(length);
 		if (!iph->id)
-			ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
+			ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 
 		iph->check = ip_fast_csum((unsigned char *)iph, iph->ihl);
 	}
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -1341,46 +1341,23 @@ void rt_bind_peer(struct rtable *rt, __b
 		rt->rt_peer_genid = rt_peer_genid();
 }
 
-/*
- * Peer allocation may fail only in serious out-of-memory conditions.  However
- * we still can generate some output.
- * Random ID selection looks a bit dangerous because we have no chances to
- * select ID being unique in a reasonable period of time.
- * But broken packet identifier may be better than no packet at all.
- */
-static void ip_select_fb_ident(struct iphdr *iph)
-{
-	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ip_fb_id_lock);
-	static u32 ip_fallback_id;
-	u32 salt;
+atomic_t *ip_idents __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents);
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&ip_fb_id_lock);
-	salt = secure_ip_id((__force __be32)ip_fallback_id ^ iph->daddr);
-	iph->id = htons(salt & 0xFFFF);
-	ip_fallback_id = salt;
-	spin_unlock_bh(&ip_fb_id_lock);
-}
-
-void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, int more)
+void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
 {
-	struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
+	static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
+	static bool hashrnd_initialized = false;
+	u32 hash, id;
 
-	if (rt && !(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOPEER)) {
-		if (rt->peer == NULL)
-			rt_bind_peer(rt, rt->rt_dst, 1);
-
-		/* If peer is attached to destination, it is never detached,
-		   so that we need not to grab a lock to dereference it.
-		 */
-		if (rt->peer) {
-			iph->id = htons(inet_getid(rt->peer, more));
-			return;
-		}
-	} else if (!rt)
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "rt_bind_peer(0) @%p\n",
-		       __builtin_return_address(0));
+	if (unlikely(!hashrnd_initialized)) {
+		hashrnd_initialized = true;
+		get_random_bytes(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
+	}
 
-	ip_select_fb_ident(iph);
+	hash = jhash_1word((__force u32)iph->daddr, ip_idents_hashrnd);
+	id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
+	iph->id = htons(id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ip_select_ident);
 
@@ -3009,7 +2986,6 @@ static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net,
 	error = rt->dst.error;
 	if (peer) {
 		inet_peer_refcheck(rt->peer);
-		id = atomic_read(&peer->ip_id_count) & 0xffff;
 		if (peer->tcp_ts_stamp) {
 			ts = peer->tcp_ts;
 			tsage = get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp;
@@ -3441,6 +3417,12 @@ int __init ip_rt_init(void)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 
+	ip_idents = kmalloc(IP_IDENTS_SZ * sizeof(*ip_idents), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ip_idents)
+		panic("IP: failed to allocate ip_idents\n");
+
+	get_random_bytes(ip_idents, IP_IDENTS_SZ * sizeof(*ip_idents));
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
 	ip_rt_acct = __alloc_percpu(256 * sizeof(struct ip_rt_acct), __alignof__(struct ip_rt_acct));
 	if (!ip_rt_acct)
--- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ static int xfrm4_mode_tunnel_output(stru
 
 	top_iph->frag_off = (flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC) ?
 		0 : (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_DF));
-	ip_select_ident(skb, dst->child, NULL);
 
 	top_iph->ttl = ip4_dst_hoplimit(dst->child);
 
 	top_iph->saddr = x->props.saddr.a4;
 	top_iph->daddr = x->id.daddr.a4;
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -599,22 +599,17 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *
 
 void ipv6_select_ident(struct frag_hdr *fhdr, struct rt6_info *rt)
 {
-	static atomic_t ipv6_fragmentation_id;
-	int ident;
+	static u32 ip6_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
+	static bool hashrnd_initialized = false;
+	u32 hash, id;
 
-	if (rt && !(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOPEER)) {
-		struct inet_peer *peer;
-
-		if (!rt->rt6i_peer)
-			rt6_bind_peer(rt, 1);
-		peer = rt->rt6i_peer;
-		if (peer) {
-			fhdr->identification = htonl(inet_getid(peer, 0));
-			return;
-		}
+	if (unlikely(!hashrnd_initialized)) {
+		hashrnd_initialized = true;
+		get_random_bytes(&ip6_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip6_idents_hashrnd));
 	}
-	ident = atomic_inc_return(&ipv6_fragmentation_id);
-	fhdr->identification = htonl(ident);
+	hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_dst.addr, ip6_idents_hashrnd);
+	id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
+	fhdr->identification = htonl(id);
 }
 
 int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *))
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ ip_vs_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 	iph->daddr		=	cp->daddr.ip;
 	iph->saddr		=	saddr;
 	iph->ttl		=	old_iph->ttl;
-	ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
+	ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
 
 	/* Another hack: avoid icmp_send in ip_fragment */
 	skb->local_df = 1;

[PATCH 3.4 02/23] ip: make IP identifiers less predictable

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]

In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.

With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.

This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.

Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.

This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.

We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.

For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.

If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.

21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
    A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
    target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64

21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
    A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
    target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64

21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
    A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
    target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64

[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/ip.h      |   11 +----------
 net/ipv4/route.c      |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/ip.h
+++ b/include/net/ip.h
@@ -264,16 +264,7 @@ int ip_dont_fragment(struct sock *sk, st
 		 !(dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU)));
 }
 
-#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
-extern atomic_t *ip_idents;
-
-static inline u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
-{
-	atomic_t *id_ptr = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
-
-	return atomic_add_return(segs, id_ptr) - segs;
-}
-
+u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs);
 void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs);
 
 static inline void ip_select_ident_segs(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, int segs)
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -1341,8 +1341,35 @@ void rt_bind_peer(struct rtable *rt, __b
 		rt->rt_peer_genid = rt_peer_genid();
 }
 
-atomic_t *ip_idents __read_mostly;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents);
+#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
+struct ip_ident_bucket {
+	atomic_t	id;
+	u32		stamp32;
+};
+
+static struct ip_ident_bucket *ip_idents __read_mostly;
+
+/* In order to protect privacy, we add a perturbation to identifiers
+ * if one generator is seldom used. This makes hard for an attacker
+ * to infer how many packets were sent between two points in time.
+ */
+u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
+{
+	struct ip_ident_bucket *bucket = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
+	u32 old = ACCESS_ONCE(bucket->stamp32);
+	u32 now = (u32)jiffies;
+	u32 delta = 0;
+
+	if (old != now && cmpxchg(&bucket->stamp32, old, now) == old) {
+		u64 x = random32();
+
+		x *= (now - old);
+		delta = (u32)(x >> 32);
+	}
+
+	return atomic_add_return(segs + delta, &bucket->id) - segs;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents_reserve);
 
 void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
 {
@@ -1355,7 +1382,10 @@ void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph
 		get_random_bytes(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
 	}
 
-	hash = jhash_1word((__force u32)iph->daddr, ip_idents_hashrnd);
+	hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
+			    (__force u32)iph->saddr,
+			    iph->protocol,
+			    ip_idents_hashrnd);
 	id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
 	iph->id = htons(id);
 }
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -608,6 +608,8 @@ void ipv6_select_ident(struct frag_hdr *
 		get_random_bytes(&ip6_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip6_idents_hashrnd));
 	}
 	hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_dst.addr, ip6_idents_hashrnd);
+	hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_src.addr, hash);
+
 	id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
 	fhdr->identification = htonl(id);
 }

[PATCH 3.4 03/23] net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 40eea803c6b2cfaab092f053248cbeab3f368412 ]

Sasha's report:
	> While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next
	> kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew:
	>
	> [ 4448.949424] ==================================================================
	> [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0
	> [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638:
	> [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813
	> [ 4448.956823]  ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40
	> [ 4448.958233]  ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d
	> [ 4448.959552]  0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000
	> [ 4448.961266] Call Trace:
	> [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
	> [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184)
	> [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352)
	> [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	> [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	> [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555)
	> [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654)
	> [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741)
	> [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740)
	> [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64)
	> [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096)
	> [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254)
	> [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273)
	> [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1))
	> [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188)
	> [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181)
	> [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	> [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607)
	> [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2))
	> [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	> [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201)
	> [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542)
	> [ 4448.988929] ==================================================================

This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg->msg_name == NULL and msg->msg_namelen > 0.

After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"
and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it.

This bug was introduced in f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic).
Commit message states that:
	"Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
	 non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
	 affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
	 address."
But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains
socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed,
verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg->msg_namelen > 0
and msg->msg_name == NULL.

This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL.

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/compat.c     |    9 +++++----
 net/core/iovec.c |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int verify_compat_iovec(struct msghdr *k
 {
 	int tot_len;
 
-	if (kern_msg->msg_namelen) {
+	if (kern_msg->msg_name && kern_msg->msg_namelen) {
 		if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
 			int err = move_addr_to_kernel(kern_msg->msg_name,
 						      kern_msg->msg_namelen,
@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ int verify_compat_iovec(struct msghdr *k
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
-		if (kern_msg->msg_name)
-			kern_msg->msg_name = kern_address;
-	} else
+		kern_msg->msg_name = kern_address;
+	} else {
 		kern_msg->msg_name = NULL;
+		kern_msg->msg_namelen = 0;
+	}
 
 	tot_len = iov_from_user_compat_to_kern(kern_iov,
 					  (struct compat_iovec __user *)kern_msg->msg_iov,
--- a/net/core/iovec.c
+++ b/net/core/iovec.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struc
 {
 	int size, ct, err;
 
-	if (m->msg_namelen) {
+	if (m->msg_name && m->msg_namelen) {
 		if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
 			void __user *namep;
 			namep = (void __user __force *) m->msg_name;
@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struc
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
-		if (m->msg_name)
-			m->msg_name = address;
+		m->msg_name = address;
 	} else {
 		m->msg_name = NULL;
+		m->msg_namelen = 0;
 	}
 
 	size = m->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);

[PATCH 3.4 04/23] tcp: Fix integer-overflows in TCP veno

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>

[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc64b3ab5d6d2215f9677e5b8c05a7d0 ]

In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion
control) was made by 159131149c2 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it
failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid().

Fixes: 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static void tcp_veno_cong_avoid(struct s
 
 		rtt = veno->minrtt;
 
-		target_cwnd = (tp->snd_cwnd * veno->basertt);
+		target_cwnd = (u64)tp->snd_cwnd * veno->basertt;
 		target_cwnd <<= V_PARAM_SHIFT;
 		do_div(target_cwnd, rtt);
 

[PATCH 3.4 05/23] tcp: Fix integer-overflow in TCP vegas

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>

[ Upstream commit 1f74e613ded11517db90b2bd57e9464d9e0fb161 ]

In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches.

Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
Fixes: 8d3a564da34e (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c
@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ static void tcp_vegas_cong_avoid(struct
 			 * This is:
 			 *     (actual rate in segments) * baseRTT
 			 */
-			target_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd * vegas->baseRTT / rtt;
+			target_cwnd = (u64)tp->snd_cwnd * vegas->baseRTT;
+			do_div(target_cwnd, rtt);
 
 			/* Calculate the difference between the window we had,
 			 * and the window we would like to have. This quantity

[PATCH 3.4 06/23] net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa ]

Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:

Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>]    lr : [<c00f32dc>]    psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8  ip : 00000000  fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000  r6 : c7be4000  r5 : 00000000  r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170  r2 : 00000001  r1 : 00000008  r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 0005397f  Table: 06f28000  DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)

While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.

Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:

  SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
  blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
  lifetime of an SCTP association.

  Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
  method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
  the original peer that started the association and not by a
  malicious attacker.

To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.

Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
  -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
  ...

Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:

  In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
  of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
  the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
  RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
  Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
  has been established.

In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:

  B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
     association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
     started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
     INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
     being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
     The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
     state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
     the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
     running and send a COOKIE ACK.

In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.

Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.

Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).

That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...

  <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------

... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().

Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...

  crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)

... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.

The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.

Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/associola.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1188,6 +1188,7 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_assoc
 	asoc->c = new->c;
 	asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
 	asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
+	asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
 	asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
 	sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
 			 asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);

[PATCH 3.4 07/23] macvlan: Initialize vlan_features to turn on offload support.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 081e83a78db9b0ae1f5eabc2dedecc865f509b98 ]

Macvlan devices do not initialize vlan_features.  As a result,
any vlan devices configured on top of macvlans perform very poorly.
Initialize vlan_features based on the vlan features of the lower-level
device.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/macvlan.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/macvlan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macvlan.c
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ static int macvlan_init(struct net_devic
 				  (lowerdev->state & MACVLAN_STATE_MASK);
 	dev->features 		= lowerdev->features & MACVLAN_FEATURES;
 	dev->features		|= NETIF_F_LLTX;
+	dev->vlan_features	= lowerdev->vlan_features & MACVLAN_FEATURES;
 	dev->gso_max_size	= lowerdev->gso_max_size;
 	dev->iflink		= lowerdev->ifindex;
 	dev->hard_header_len	= lowerdev->hard_header_len;

[PATCH 3.4 08/23] net: Correctly set segment mac_len in skb_segment().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa4cb74391d42b6a26dc07c20dab1d82 ]

When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right
out of the original skb.  However, this value is not always set correctly
(like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad
value.

One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags
packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding
bridge port.  The packets show up corrupt like this:
16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 > 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q
(0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0,
        0x0000:  8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d.
        0x0010:  0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0..
        0x0020:  29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3
        0x0030:  000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp
        0x0040:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0050:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0060:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        ...

This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and
cause retransmissions.

The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available
in then new skb.  We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we
might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len().
After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance
is restored.

CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/skbuff.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -2748,7 +2748,6 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_bu
 		tail = nskb;
 
 		__copy_skb_header(nskb, skb);
-		nskb->mac_len = skb->mac_len;
 
 		/* nskb and skb might have different headroom */
 		if (nskb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
@@ -2758,6 +2757,7 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_bu
 		skb_set_network_header(nskb, skb->mac_len);
 		nskb->transport_header = (nskb->network_header +
 					  skb_network_header_len(skb));
+		skb_reset_mac_len(nskb);
 		skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, nskb->data, doffset);
 
 		if (fskb != skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list)

[PATCH 3.4 09/23] iovec: make sure the caller actually wants anything in memcpy_fromiovecend

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 06ebb06d49486676272a3c030bfeef4bd969a8e6 ]

Check for cases when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running off
and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/iovec.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/iovec.c
+++ b/net/core/iovec.c
@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_fromiovec);
 int memcpy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata, const struct iovec *iov,
 			int offset, int len)
 {
+	/* No data? Done! */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Skip over the finished iovecs */
 	while (offset >= iov->iov_len) {
 		offset -= iov->iov_len;

[PATCH 3.4 10/23] sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 757efd32d5ce31f67193cc0e6a56e4dffcc42fb1 ]

Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of
IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context.

BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33
 ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207
 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40
 ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff9e7ee207>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
 [<ffffffff9e397eaa>] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100
 [<ffffffff9e397ee3>] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 [<ffffffffc0839872>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffc082a7f2>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff9e0d985c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0
 [<ffffffff9e7f8c6d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80
 [<ffffffffc082b99a>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffc081e112>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffc081c86b>] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff9e0b8f1b>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100
 [<ffffffffc083b350>] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffc08389ca>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffc083358f>] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff9e0d673a>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160
 [<ffffffff9e0d62ce>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30
 [<ffffffff9e73b624>] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220
 [<ffffffff9e73b525>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220
 [<ffffffff9e68ac4e>] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0
 [<ffffffff9e1c0c09>] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0
 [<ffffffff9e1c0bae>] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0
 [<ffffffff9e68b234>] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0
 [<ffffffff9e0136b0>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330
 [<ffffffff9e68c3ce>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
 [<ffffffff9e7f9be4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

This is a followup of commits f1d8cba61c3c4b ("inet: fix possible
seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b23afbd315 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock
deadlock in ip6_finish_output2")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/output.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/output.c
+++ b/net/sctp/output.c
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ out:
 	return err;
 no_route:
 	kfree_skb(nskb);
-	IP_INC_STATS_BH(&init_net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
+	IP_INC_STATS(&init_net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
 
 	/* FIXME: Returning the 'err' will effect all the associations
 	 * associated with a socket, although only one of the paths of the

[PATCH 3.4 11/23] sparc64: Fix argument sign extension for compat_sys_futex().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit aa3449ee9c87d9b7660dd1493248abcc57769e31 ]

Only the second argument, 'op', is signed.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ SIGN1(sys32_io_submit, compat_sys_io_sub
 SIGN1(sys32_mq_open, compat_sys_mq_open, %o1)
 SIGN1(sys32_select, compat_sys_select, %o0)
 SIGN1(sys32_mkdir, sys_mkdir, %o1)
-SIGN3(sys32_futex, compat_sys_futex, %o1, %o2, %o5)
+SIGN1(sys32_futex, compat_sys_futex, %o1)
 SIGN1(sys32_sysfs, compat_sys_sysfs, %o0)
 SIGN2(sys32_sendfile, compat_sys_sendfile, %o0, %o1)
 SIGN2(sys32_sendfile64, compat_sys_sendfile64, %o0, %o1)

[PATCH 3.4 12/23] sparc64: Make itc_sync_lock raw

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>

[ Upstream commit 49b6c01f4c1de3b5e5427ac5aba80f9f6d27837a ]

One more place where we must not be able
to be preempted or to be interrupted in RT.

Always actually disable interrupts during
synchronization cycle.

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void cpu_panic(void)
 #define NUM_ROUNDS	64	/* magic value */
 #define NUM_ITERS	5	/* likewise */
 
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(itc_sync_lock);
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(itc_sync_lock);
 static unsigned long go[SLAVE + 1];
 
 #define DEBUG_TICK_SYNC	0
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static void smp_synchronize_one_tick(int
 	go[MASTER] = 0;
 	membar_safe("#StoreLoad");
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&itc_sync_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&itc_sync_lock, flags);
 	{
 		for (i = 0; i < NUM_ROUNDS*NUM_ITERS; i++) {
 			while (!go[MASTER])
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static void smp_synchronize_one_tick(int
 			membar_safe("#StoreLoad");
 		}
 	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&itc_sync_lock, flags);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&itc_sync_lock, flags);
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_SUN_LDOMS) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU)

[PATCH 3.4 13/23] sparc64: Handle 32-bit tasks properly in compute_effective_address().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit d037d16372bbe4d580342bebbb8826821ad9edf0 ]

If we have a 32-bit task we must chop off the top 32-bits of the
64-bit value just as the cpu would.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/unaligned_64.c |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/unaligned_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/unaligned_64.c
@@ -156,17 +156,23 @@ static unsigned long *fetch_reg_addr(uns
 unsigned long compute_effective_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
 					unsigned int insn, unsigned int rd)
 {
+	int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
 	unsigned int rs1 = (insn >> 14) & 0x1f;
 	unsigned int rs2 = insn & 0x1f;
-	int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
+	unsigned long addr;
 
 	if (insn & 0x2000) {
 		maybe_flush_windows(rs1, 0, rd, from_kernel);
-		return (fetch_reg(rs1, regs) + sign_extend_imm13(insn));
+		addr = (fetch_reg(rs1, regs) + sign_extend_imm13(insn));
 	} else {
 		maybe_flush_windows(rs1, rs2, rd, from_kernel);
-		return (fetch_reg(rs1, regs) + fetch_reg(rs2, regs));
+		addr = (fetch_reg(rs1, regs) + fetch_reg(rs2, regs));
 	}
+
+	if (!from_kernel && test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
+		addr &= 0xffffffff;
+
+	return addr;
 }
 
 /* This is just to make gcc think die_if_kernel does return... */

[PATCH 3.4 14/23] sparc64: Fix top-level fault handling bugs.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 70ffc6ebaead783ac8dafb1e87df0039bb043596 ]

Make get_user_insn() able to cope with huge PMDs.

Next, make do_fault_siginfo() more robust when get_user_insn() can't
actually fetch the instruction.  In particular, use the MMU announced
fault address when that happens, instead of calling
compute_effective_address() and computing garbage.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c |   84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c
@@ -95,38 +95,51 @@ static unsigned int get_user_insn(unsign
 	pte_t *ptep, pte;
 	unsigned long pa;
 	u32 insn = 0;
-	unsigned long pstate;
 
-	if (pgd_none(*pgdp))
-		goto outret;
+	if (pgd_none(*pgdp) || unlikely(pgd_bad(*pgdp)))
+		goto out;
 	pudp = pud_offset(pgdp, tpc);
-	if (pud_none(*pudp))
-		goto outret;
-	pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, tpc);
-	if (pmd_none(*pmdp))
-		goto outret;
-
-	/* This disables preemption for us as well. */
-	__asm__ __volatile__("rdpr %%pstate, %0" : "=r" (pstate));
-	__asm__ __volatile__("wrpr %0, %1, %%pstate"
-				: : "r" (pstate), "i" (PSTATE_IE));
-	ptep = pte_offset_map(pmdp, tpc);
-	pte = *ptep;
-	if (!pte_present(pte))
+	if (pud_none(*pudp) || unlikely(pud_bad(*pudp)))
 		goto out;
 
-	pa  = (pte_pfn(pte) << PAGE_SHIFT);
-	pa += (tpc & ~PAGE_MASK);
+	/* This disables preemption for us as well. */
+	local_irq_disable();
 
-	/* Use phys bypass so we don't pollute dtlb/dcache. */
-	__asm__ __volatile__("lduwa [%1] %2, %0"
-			     : "=r" (insn)
-			     : "r" (pa), "i" (ASI_PHYS_USE_EC));
+	pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, tpc);
+	if (pmd_none(*pmdp) || unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmdp)))
+		goto out_irq_enable;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+	if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmdp)) {
+		if (pmd_trans_splitting(*pmdp))
+			goto out_irq_enable;
+
+		pa  = pmd_pfn(*pmdp) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pa += tpc & ~HPAGE_MASK;
+
+		/* Use phys bypass so we don't pollute dtlb/dcache. */
+		__asm__ __volatile__("lduwa [%1] %2, %0"
+				     : "=r" (insn)
+				     : "r" (pa), "i" (ASI_PHYS_USE_EC));
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		ptep = pte_offset_map(pmdp, tpc);
+		pte = *ptep;
+		if (pte_present(pte)) {
+			pa  = (pte_pfn(pte) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+			pa += (tpc & ~PAGE_MASK);
+
+			/* Use phys bypass so we don't pollute dtlb/dcache. */
+			__asm__ __volatile__("lduwa [%1] %2, %0"
+					     : "=r" (insn)
+					     : "r" (pa), "i" (ASI_PHYS_USE_EC));
+		}
+		pte_unmap(ptep);
+	}
+out_irq_enable:
+	local_irq_enable();
 out:
-	pte_unmap(ptep);
-	__asm__ __volatile__("wrpr %0, 0x0, %%pstate" : : "r" (pstate));
-outret:
 	return insn;
 }
 
@@ -154,7 +167,8 @@ show_signal_msg(struct pt_regs *regs, in
 extern unsigned long compute_effective_address(struct pt_regs *, unsigned int, unsigned int);
 
 static void do_fault_siginfo(int code, int sig, struct pt_regs *regs,
-			     unsigned int insn, int fault_code)
+			     unsigned long fault_addr, unsigned int insn,
+			     int fault_code)
 {
 	unsigned long addr;
 	siginfo_t info;
@@ -162,10 +176,18 @@ static void do_fault_siginfo(int code, i
 	info.si_code = code;
 	info.si_signo = sig;
 	info.si_errno = 0;
-	if (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB)
+	if (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB) {
 		addr = regs->tpc;
-	else
-		addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
+	} else {
+		/* If we were able to probe the faulting instruction, use it
+		 * to compute a precise fault address.  Otherwise use the fault
+		 * time provided address which may only have page granularity.
+		 */
+		if (insn)
+			addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
+		else
+			addr = fault_addr;
+	}
 	info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
 	info.si_trapno = 0;
 
@@ -240,7 +262,7 @@ static void __kprobes do_kernel_fault(st
 		/* The si_code was set to make clear whether
 		 * this was a SEGV_MAPERR or SEGV_ACCERR fault.
 		 */
-		do_fault_siginfo(si_code, SIGSEGV, regs, insn, fault_code);
+		do_fault_siginfo(si_code, SIGSEGV, regs, address, insn, fault_code);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -515,7 +537,7 @@ do_sigbus:
 	 * Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
 	 * or user mode.
 	 */
-	do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, regs, insn, fault_code);
+	do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, regs, address, insn, fault_code);
 
 	/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
 	if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)

[PATCH 3.4 15/23] sparc64: Dont bark so loudly about 32-bit tasks generating 64-bit fault addresses.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit e5c460f46ae7ee94831cb55cb980f942aa9e5a85 ]

This was found using Dave Jone's trinity tool.

When a user process which is 32-bit performs a load or a store, the
cpu chops off the top 32-bits of the effective address before
translating it.

This is because we run 32-bit tasks with the PSTATE_AM (address
masking) bit set.

We can't run the kernel with that bit set, so when the kernel accesses
userspace no address masking occurs.

Since a 32-bit process will have no mappings in that region we will
properly fault, so we don't try to handle this using access_ok(),
which can safely just be a NOP on sparc64.

Real faults from 32-bit processes should never generate such addresses
so a bug check was added long ago, and it barks in the logs if this
happens.

But it also barks when a kernel user access causes this condition, and
that _can_ happen.  For example, if a pointer passed into a system call
is "0xfffffffc" and the kernel access 4 bytes offset from that pointer.

Just handle such faults normally via the exception entries.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c |   16 +---------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c
@@ -282,18 +282,6 @@ static void noinline __kprobes bogus_32b
 	show_regs(regs);
 }
 
-static void noinline __kprobes bogus_32bit_fault_address(struct pt_regs *regs,
-							 unsigned long addr)
-{
-	static int times;
-
-	if (times++ < 10)
-		printk(KERN_ERR "FAULT[%s:%d]: 32-bit process "
-		       "reports 64-bit fault address [%lx]\n",
-		       current->comm, current->pid, addr);
-	show_regs(regs);
-}
-
 asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -322,10 +310,8 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fau
 				goto intr_or_no_mm;
 			}
 		}
-		if (unlikely((address >> 32) != 0)) {
-			bogus_32bit_fault_address(regs, address);
+		if (unlikely((address >> 32) != 0))
 			goto intr_or_no_mm;
-		}
 	}
 
 	if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {

[PATCH 3.4 16/23] sparc64: Fix huge TSB mapping on pre-UltraSPARC-III cpus.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit b18eb2d779240631a098626cb6841ee2dd34fda0 ]

Access to the TSB hash tables during TLB misses requires that there be
an atomic 128-bit quad load available so that we fetch a matching TAG
and DATA field at the same time.

On cpus prior to UltraSPARC-III only virtual address based quad loads
are available.  UltraSPARC-III and later provide physical address
based variants which are easier to use.

When we only have virtual address based quad loads available this
means that we have to lock the TSB into the TLB at a fixed virtual
address on each cpu when it runs that process.  We can't just access
the PAGE_OFFSET based aliased mapping of these TSBs because we cannot
take a recursive TLB miss inside of the TLB miss handler without
risking running out of hardware trap levels (some trap combinations
can be deep, such as those generated by register window spill and fill
traps).

Without huge pages it's working perfectly fine, but when the huge TSB
got added another chunk of fixed virtual address space was not
allocated for this second TSB mapping.

So we were mapping both the 8K and 4MB TSBs to the same exact virtual
address, causing multiple TLB matches which gives undefined behavior.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h |    6 ++++--
 arch/sparc/mm/tsb.c                 |   14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
 
 /* The kernel image occupies 0x4000000 to 0x6000000 (4MB --> 96MB).
  * The page copy blockops can use 0x6000000 to 0x8000000.
- * The TSB is mapped in the 0x8000000 to 0xa000000 range.
+ * The 8K TSB is mapped in the 0x8000000 to 0x8400000 range.
+ * The 4M TSB is mapped in the 0x8400000 to 0x8800000 range.
  * The PROM resides in an area spanning 0xf0000000 to 0x100000000.
  * The vmalloc area spans 0x100000000 to 0x200000000.
  * Since modules need to be in the lowest 32-bits of the address space,
@@ -33,7 +34,8 @@
  * 0x400000000.
  */
 #define	TLBTEMP_BASE		_AC(0x0000000006000000,UL)
-#define	TSBMAP_BASE		_AC(0x0000000008000000,UL)
+#define	TSBMAP_8K_BASE		_AC(0x0000000008000000,UL)
+#define	TSBMAP_4M_BASE		_AC(0x0000000008400000,UL)
 #define MODULES_VADDR		_AC(0x0000000010000000,UL)
 #define MODULES_LEN		_AC(0x00000000e0000000,UL)
 #define MODULES_END		_AC(0x00000000f0000000,UL)
--- a/arch/sparc/mm/tsb.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/mm/tsb.c
@@ -150,7 +150,19 @@ static void setup_tsb_params(struct mm_s
 	mm->context.tsb_block[tsb_idx].tsb_nentries =
 		tsb_bytes / sizeof(struct tsb);
 
-	base = TSBMAP_BASE;
+	switch (tsb_idx) {
+	case MM_TSB_BASE:
+		base = TSBMAP_8K_BASE;
+		break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) || defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
+	case MM_TSB_HUGE:
+		base = TSBMAP_4M_BASE;
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
 	tte = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_LOCKED);
 	tsb_paddr = __pa(mm->context.tsb_block[tsb_idx].tsb);
 	BUG_ON(tsb_paddr & (tsb_bytes - 1UL));

[PATCH 3.4 17/23] sparc64: Add membar to Niagara2 memcpy code.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 5aa4ecfd0ddb1e6dcd1c886e6c49677550f581aa ]

This is the prevent previous stores from overlapping the block stores
done by the memcpy loop.

Based upon a glibc patch by Jose E. Marchesi

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/lib/NG2memcpy.S |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/sparc/lib/NG2memcpy.S
+++ b/arch/sparc/lib/NG2memcpy.S
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ FUNC_NAME:	/* %o0=dst, %o1=src, %o2=len
 	 */
 	VISEntryHalf
 
+	membar		#Sync
 	alignaddr	%o1, %g0, %g0
 
 	add		%o1, (64 - 1), %o4

[PATCH 3.4 18/23] sparc64: Do not insert non-valid PTEs into the TSB hash table.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 18f38132528c3e603c66ea464727b29e9bbcb91b ]

The assumption was that update_mmu_cache() (and the equivalent for PMDs) would
only be called when the PTE being installed will be accessible by the user.

This is not true for code paths originating from remove_migration_pte().

There are dire consequences for placing a non-valid PTE into the TSB.  The TLB
miss frramework assumes thatwhen a TSB entry matches we can just load it into
the TLB and return from the TLB miss trap.

So if a non-valid PTE is in there, we will deadlock taking the TLB miss over
and over, never satisfying the miss.

Just exit early from update_mmu_cache() and friends in this situation.

Based upon a report and patch from Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
@@ -308,6 +308,10 @@ void update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_str
 	tsb_index = MM_TSB_BASE;
 	tsb_hash_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
 
+	/* Don't insert a non-valid PTE into the TSB, we'll deadlock.  */
+	if (!(pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_VALID))
+		return;
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&mm->context.lock, flags);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE

[PATCH 3.4 19/23] sparc64: Guard against flushing openfirmware mappings.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 4ca9a23765da3260058db3431faf5b4efd8cf926 ]

Based almost entirely upon a patch by Christopher Alexander Tobias
Schulze.

In commit db64fe02258f1507e13fe5212a989922323685ce ("mm: rewrite vmap
layer") lazy VMAP tlb flushing was added to the vmalloc layer.  This
causes problems on sparc64.

Sparc64 has two VMAP mapped regions and they are not contiguous with
eachother.  First we have the malloc mapping area, then another
unrelated region, then the vmalloc region.

This "another unrelated region" is where the firmware is mapped.

If the lazy TLB flushing logic in the vmalloc code triggers after
we've had both a module unload and a vfree or similar, it will pass an
address range that goes from somewhere inside the malloc region to
somewhere inside the vmalloc region, and thus covering the
openfirmware area entirely.

The sparc64 kernel learns about openfirmware's dynamic mappings in
this region early in the boot, and then services TLB misses in this
area.  But openfirmware has some locked TLB entries which are not
mentioned in those dynamic mappings and we should thus not disturb
them.

These huge lazy TLB flush ranges causes those openfirmware locked TLB
entries to be removed, resulting in all kinds of problems including
hard hangs and crashes during reboot/reset.

Besides causing problems like this, such huge TLB flush ranges are
also incredibly inefficient.  A plea has been made with the author of
the VMAP lazy TLB flushing code, but for now we'll put a safety guard
into our flush_tlb_kernel_range() implementation.

Since the implementation has become non-trivial, stop defining it as a
macro and instead make it a function in a C source file.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h |   12 ++----------
 arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c              |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_range(struc
 {
 }
 
+void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_ENTER_LAZY_MMU_MODE
 
 extern void flush_tlb_pending(void);
@@ -49,11 +51,6 @@ extern void __flush_tlb_kernel_range(uns
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_SMP
 
-#define flush_tlb_kernel_range(start,end) \
-do {	flush_tsb_kernel_range(start,end); \
-	__flush_tlb_kernel_range(start,end); \
-} while (0)
-
 static inline void global_flush_tlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
 {
 	__flush_tlb_page(CTX_HWBITS(mm->context), vaddr);
@@ -64,11 +61,6 @@ static inline void global_flush_tlb_page
 extern void smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
 extern void smp_flush_tlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr);
 
-#define flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end) \
-do {	flush_tsb_kernel_range(start,end); \
-	smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end); \
-} while (0)
-
 #define global_flush_tlb_page(mm, vaddr) \
 	smp_flush_tlb_page(mm, vaddr)
 
--- a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
@@ -2421,3 +2421,26 @@ void __flush_tlb_all(void)
 	__asm__ __volatile__("wrpr	%0, 0, %%pstate"
 			     : : "r" (pstate));
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+#define do_flush_tlb_kernel_range	smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range
+#else
+#define do_flush_tlb_kernel_range	__flush_tlb_kernel_range
+#endif
+
+void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	if (start < HI_OBP_ADDRESS && end > LOW_OBP_ADDRESS) {
+		if (start < LOW_OBP_ADDRESS) {
+			flush_tsb_kernel_range(start, LOW_OBP_ADDRESS);
+			do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, LOW_OBP_ADDRESS);
+		}
+		if (end > HI_OBP_ADDRESS) {
+			flush_tsb_kernel_range(end, HI_OBP_ADDRESS);
+			do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(end, HI_OBP_ADDRESS);
+		}
+	} else {
+		flush_tsb_kernel_range(start, end);
+		do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end);
+	}
+}

[PATCH 3.4 20/23] bbc-i2c: Fix BBC I2C envctrl on SunBlade 2000

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>

[ Upstream commit 5cdceab3d5e02eb69ea0f5d8fa9181800baf6f77 ]

Fix regression in bbc i2c temperature and fan control on some Sun systems
that causes the driver to refuse to load due to the bbc_i2c_bussel resource not
being present on the (second) i2c bus where the temperature sensors and fan
control are located. (The check for the number of resources was removed when
the driver was ported to a pure OF driver in mid 2008.)

Signed-off-by: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c |    6 ++++++
 drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c     |   11 ++++++++---
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c
@@ -452,6 +452,9 @@ static void attach_one_temp(struct bbc_i
 	if (!tp)
 		return;
 
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->bp_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->glob_list);
+
 	tp->client = bbc_i2c_attach(bp, op);
 	if (!tp->client) {
 		kfree(tp);
@@ -497,6 +500,9 @@ static void attach_one_fan(struct bbc_i2
 	if (!fp)
 		return;
 
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->bp_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->glob_list);
+
 	fp->client = bbc_i2c_attach(bp, op);
 	if (!fp->client) {
 		kfree(fp);
--- a/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c
+++ b/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c
@@ -301,13 +301,18 @@ static struct bbc_i2c_bus * __init attac
 	if (!bp)
 		return NULL;
 
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bp->temps);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bp->fans);
+
 	bp->i2c_control_regs = of_ioremap(&op->resource[0], 0, 0x2, "bbc_i2c_regs");
 	if (!bp->i2c_control_regs)
 		goto fail;
 
-	bp->i2c_bussel_reg = of_ioremap(&op->resource[1], 0, 0x1, "bbc_i2c_bussel");
-	if (!bp->i2c_bussel_reg)
-		goto fail;
+	if (op->num_resources == 2) {
+		bp->i2c_bussel_reg = of_ioremap(&op->resource[1], 0, 0x1, "bbc_i2c_bussel");
+		if (!bp->i2c_bussel_reg)
+			goto fail;
+	}
 
 	bp->waiting = 0;
 	init_waitqueue_head(&bp->wq);

[PATCH 3.4 21/23] sunsab: Fix detection of BREAK on sunsab serial console

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>

[ Upstream commit fe418231b195c205701c0cc550a03f6c9758fd9e ]

Fix detection of BREAK on sunsab serial console: BREAK detection was only
performed when there were also serial characters received simultaneously.
To handle all BREAKs correctly, the check for BREAK and the corresponding
call to uart_handle_break() must also be done if count == 0, therefore
duplicate this code fragment and pull it out of the loop over the received
characters.

Patch applies to 3.16-rc6.

Signed-off-by: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c
@@ -157,6 +157,15 @@ receive_chars(struct uart_sunsab_port *u
 	    (up->port.line == up->port.cons->index))
 		saw_console_brk = 1;
 
+	if (count == 0) {
+		if (unlikely(stat->sreg.isr1 & SAB82532_ISR1_BRK)) {
+			stat->sreg.isr0 &= ~(SAB82532_ISR0_PERR |
+					     SAB82532_ISR0_FERR);
+			up->port.icount.brk++;
+			uart_handle_break(&up->port);
+		}
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		unsigned char ch = buf[i], flag;
 

[PATCH 3.4 22/23] sparc64: ldc_connect() should not return EINVAL when handshake is in progress.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 4ec1b01029b4facb651b8ef70bc20a4be4cebc63 ]

The LDC handshake could have been asynchronously triggered
after ldc_bind() enables the ldc_rx() receive interrupt-handler
(and thus intercepts incoming control packets)
and before vio_port_up() calls ldc_connect(). If that is the case,
ldc_connect() should return 0 and let the state-machine
progress.

Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Karl Volz <karl.volz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ int ldc_connect(struct ldc_channel *lp)
 	if (!(lp->flags & LDC_FLAG_ALLOCED_QUEUES) ||
 	    !(lp->flags & LDC_FLAG_REGISTERED_QUEUES) ||
 	    lp->hs_state != LDC_HS_OPEN)
-		err = -EINVAL;
+		err = ((lp->hs_state > LDC_HS_OPEN) ? 0 : -EINVAL);
 	else
 		err = start_handshake(lp);
 

[PATCH 3.4 23/23] arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c: drop stray break operator

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 093758e3daede29cb4ce6aedb111becf9d4bfc57 ]

This commit is a guesswork, but it seems to make sense to drop this
break, as otherwise the following line is never executed and becomes
dead code. And that following line actually saves the result of
local calculation by the pointer given in function argument. So the
proposed change makes sense if this code in the whole makes sense (but I
am unable to analyze it in the whole).

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=81641
Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int do_one_mathemu(u32 insn, unsi
 		case 0: fsr = *pfsr;
 			if (IR == -1) IR = 2;
 			/* fcc is always fcc0 */
-			fsr &= ~0xc00; fsr |= (IR << 10); break;
+			fsr &= ~0xc00; fsr |= (IR << 10);
 			*pfsr = fsr;
 			break;
 		case 1: rd->s = IR; break;

Re: [PATCH 3.4 00/23] 3.4.103-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 08/08/2014 02:34 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.103 release.
> There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun Aug 10 21:33:01 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>

Build results:
	total: 115 pass: 109 fail: 6
Failed builds:
	alpha:allmodconfig
	arm:s5pv210_defconfig
	score:defconfig
	sparc64:allmodconfig
	unicore32:defconfig
	xtensa:allmodconfig

Qemu tests all passed.

Results are as expected.

Details are available at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 3.4 00/23] 3.4.103-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 08/08/2014 03:34 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.103 release.
> There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun Aug 10 21:33:01 UTC 2014.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.103-rc1.gz
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

-- Shuah


-- 
Shuah Khan
Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
shuah.kh@samsung.com | (970) 672-0658