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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@intel.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: Tainting the kernel on raw I/O access
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2014 23:15:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140903221547.GA21800@srcf.ucam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5407863B.9030608@intel.com>

(Cc: Kees)

On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 02:20:59PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> In a meeting earlier today, we discussed MSR access and that it could be
> used to do bad things.  The same applies to other forms of raw I/O
> (/dev/mem, /dev/port, ioperm, iopl, etc.)
> 
> This is basically the same problem with which the secure boot people
> have been struggling.
> 
> Peter Z. suggested we should taint the kernel on raw I/O access, and I
> tend to concur.
> 
> So what I would like to suggest is that we create a new kernel helper
> function which can return an error in secure boot mode and otherwise
> taints the kernel with a raw I/O taint.
> 
> What do people think?

Not a bad plan, but there's a couple of places where you'd want to 
forbid stuff in Secure Boot without tainting the kernel in the generic 
use-case, so there's still some problem to solve there.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-03 22:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-03 21:20 RFC: Tainting the kernel on raw I/O access H. Peter Anvin
2014-09-03 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2014-09-03 22:20 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-09-03 22:25   ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-09-04 15:56     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-09-03 23:46 ` Andi Kleen
2014-09-04 14:10   ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2014-09-04 16:43     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-09-04  5:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2014-09-04 16:47   ` One Thousand Gnomes

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