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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tj@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	lizefan@huawei.com, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp
Subject: Re: Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics
Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2014 00:21:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140919222103.GH2832@worktop.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201409192053.IHJ35462.JLOMOSOFFVtQFH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 08:53:33PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> cpuset_update_task_spread_flag() is updating other thread's
> "struct task_struct"->flags without exclusion control or atomic
> operations!
> 
> ---------- linux-2.6.32-358.23.2.el6/kernel/cpuset.c ----------
> 300:/*
> 301: * update task's spread flag if cpuset's page/slab spread flag is set
> 302: *
> 303: * Called with callback_mutex/cgroup_mutex held
> 304: */
> 305:static void cpuset_update_task_spread_flag(struct cpuset *cs,
> 306:                                    struct task_struct *tsk)
> 307:{
> 308:    if (is_spread_page(cs))
> 309:            tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 310:    else
> 311:            tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_PAGE;
> 312:    if (is_spread_slab(cs))
> 313:            tsk->flags |= PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 314:    else
> 315:            tsk->flags &= ~PF_SPREAD_SLAB;
> 316:}

So that is indeed clearly buggy and should not be done. One should only
every change current->flags.

Most sites do indeed do that, with exceptions:

 fork.c: some assignments are done before the new task is visible - safe
 __kthread_bind: requires that the task is sleeping - safe
 workqueue/worker: same as __kthread_bind, the task is asleep - safe
 workqueue/rescue: is current - safe

Which does indeed leave this cpuset exception which is clearly and
obviously broken.

The 'simple' solution would be to force 'suspend/freeze' the task while
poking at its ->flags.



  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-19 22:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-19 11:53 Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-19 22:21 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2014-09-20  5:55 ` Zefan Li
2014-09-20 10:40   ` [PATCH 3.17-rc5] Fix confusing PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS constant Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-20 17:19     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 14:30   ` Racy manipulation of task_struct->flags in cgroups code causes hard to reproduce kernel panics Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:15     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-20 18:04       ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-09-20 17:28   ` Tejun Heo
2014-09-21  5:15     ` Tetsuo Handa
2014-09-22  2:15       ` Zefan Li

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