Re: [PATCH] sysctl: terminate strings also on \r

[Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2014 16:43:10 -0700 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Andrew Morton
> <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, 21 Oct 2014 13:21:37 -0700 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> >> From: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net>
> >>
> >> This partially mitigates a common strategy used by attackers for hiding
> >> the full contents of strings in procfs from naive sysadmins who use cat,
> >> more or sysctl to inspect the contents of strings in procfs.
> >>
> >> ...
> >>
> >> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> >> @@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static int _proc_do_string(char *data, int maxlen, int write,
> >>               while ((p - buffer) < *lenp && len < maxlen - 1) {
> >>                       if (get_user(c, p++))
> >>                               return -EFAULT;
> >> -                     if (c == 0 || c == '\n')
> >> +                     if (c == 0 || c == '\n' || c == '\r')
> >>                               break;
> >>                       data[len++] = c;
> >>               }
> >
> > There are no valid uses of \r in a procfs write?
> 
> I struggle to imagine one; everything I found that uses proc_dostring
> seems to be names, paths, and commands.
> 

You're insufficiently pessimistic.

I wonder if the chances of damage would be lower if we were to continue
to accept the \r, but turn it into something else ("\r"?) when it is
read.