From: josh@joshtriplett.org
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Eric W.Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] groups: Allow unprivileged processes to use setgroups to drop groups
Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 14:37:30 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141117223730.GA961@cloud> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWXC5dMOXTTBOiq4Cv+yjqbA_UdmAN-TDmNAJUo+ABxtg@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 02:22:59PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Eric W.Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On November 17, 2014 1:07:30 PM EST, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> >>On Nov 17, 2014 3:37 AM, "One Thousand Gnomes"
> >><gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> > optional), I can do that too. The security model of "having a
> >>group
> >>> > gives you less privilege than not having it" seems crazy, but
> >>> > nonetheless I can see a couple of easy ways that we can avoid
> >>breaking
> >>>
> >>> It's an old pattern of use that makes complete sense in a traditional
> >>> Unix permission world because it's the only way to do "exclude
> >>{list}"
> >>> nicely. Our default IMHO shouldn't break this.
> >>>
> >>> > that pattern, no_new_privs being one of them. I'd like to make
> >>sure
> >>> > that nobody sees any other real-world corner case that unprivileged
> >>> > setgroups would break.
> >>>
> >>> Barring the usual risk of people doing improper error checking I
> >>don't
> >>> see one immediately.
> >>>
> >>> For containers I think it actually makes sense that the sysctl can be
> >>> applied per container anyway.
> >>
> >>We'll probably need per container sysctls some day.
> >
> > We already have a mess of per network namespace sysctls,
> > as well as few for other namespaces.
> >
> > We have the infrastructure it is just a matter of using it for whatever purpose we need.
> >
>
> A list of group id ranges that it's permissible to drop would do the
> trick, both for setgroups and for unshare. The downside would be that
> users in those groups (i.e. everyone by default) would not be able to
> unshare their user ns.
>
> Better ideas welcome.
Personally, I think that seems like more flexibility than necessary to
achieve the goal. I think a sysctl turning group-dropping on and off
would suffice; systems that know they don't use groups to exclude
specific users can enable that sysctl.
- Josh Triplett
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-11-17 22:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-15 9:00 [PATCH 1/2] groups: Factor out a function to set a pre-sorted group list Josh Triplett
2014-11-15 9:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] groups: Allow unprivileged processes to use setgroups to drop groups Josh Triplett
2014-11-15 15:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-15 19:29 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-15 20:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-15 20:20 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-16 2:05 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-11-16 2:35 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-16 3:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-16 5:07 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-16 13:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-11-16 15:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-16 19:12 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-16 19:09 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-16 3:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-11-16 4:52 ` Josh Triplett
2014-11-17 11:37 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-11-17 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 22:11 ` Eric W.Biederman
2014-11-17 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 22:37 ` josh [this message]
2014-11-18 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-17 18:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-17 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 18:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-27 16:59 ` [CFT][PATCH] userns: Avoid problems with negative groups Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-27 20:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-28 5:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-28 5:22 ` [CFT][PATCH v2] " Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-28 15:11 ` [CFT][PATCH] " Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-28 16:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-11-28 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 22:41 ` [PATCH 2/2] groups: Allow unprivileged processes to use setgroups to drop groups Eric W.Biederman
2014-11-17 22:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-11-17 23:13 ` josh
2014-11-15 9:01 ` [PATCH manpages] getgroups.2: Document unprivileged setgroups calls Josh Triplett
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