From: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() directly called
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 11:14:21 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150722021421.5155.99671.stgit@softrs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150722021421.5155.74460.stgit@softrs>
Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time.
For example (x86 case):
CPU 0:
oops_end()
crash_kexec()
mutex_trylock() // acquired
nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other cpus
CPU 1:
panic()
crash_kexec()
mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire
smp_send_stop() // stop other cpus
infinite loop
If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump
fails.
In another case:
CPU 0:
oops_end()
crash_kexec()
mutex_trylock() // acquired
<NMI>
io_check_error()
panic()
crash_kexec()
mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire
infinite loop
Clearly, this is an undesirable result.
To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude
others by using panic_lock.
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kexec.h | 2 ++
kernel/kexec.c | 12 +++++++++++-
kernel/panic.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index e804306..bd6e477 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ extern int kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(struct kimage *image,
extern void *kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(struct kimage *image,
const char *name);
extern void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *);
+extern void __crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *);
int kexec_should_crash(struct task_struct *);
void crash_save_cpu(struct pt_regs *regs, int cpu);
void crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void);
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ int parse_crashkernel_low(char *cmdline, unsigned long long system_ram,
struct pt_regs;
struct task_struct;
static inline void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
+static inline void __crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline int kexec_should_crash(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index a785c10..fcdd825 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ void __weak crash_unmap_reserved_pages(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
-void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void __crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Take the kexec_mutex here to prevent sys_kexec_load
* running on one cpu from replacing the crash kernel
@@ -1493,6 +1493,16 @@ void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
}
+void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (spin_trylock_irqsave(&panic_lock, flags)) {
+ __crash_kexec(regs);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&panic_lock, flags);
+ }
+}
+
size_t crash_get_memory_size(void)
{
size_t size = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 3c8338b..ce5c8ab 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ void __panic(char *msg)
* the "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option to the kernel.
*/
if (!crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
- crash_kexec(NULL);
+ __crash_kexec(NULL);
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void __panic(char *msg)
* more unstable, it can increase risks of the kdump failure too.
*/
if (crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
- crash_kexec(NULL);
+ __crash_kexec(NULL);
bust_spinlocks(0);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-22 7:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-22 2:14 [PATCH 0/3] x86: Fix panic vs. NMI issues Hidehiro Kawai
2015-07-22 2:14 ` Hidehiro Kawai [this message]
2015-07-22 2:14 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/panic: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI Hidehiro Kawai
2015-07-23 8:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2015-07-23 9:43 ` Hidehiro Kawai
2015-07-22 2:14 ` [PATCH 3/3] x86/apic: Introduce noextnmi boot option Hidehiro Kawai
2015-07-23 8:25 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: Fix panic vs. NMI issues Michal Hocko
2015-07-23 10:11 ` Hidehiro Kawai
2015-07-23 11:25 ` Michal Hocko
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20150722021421.5155.99671.stgit@softrs \
--to=hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vgoyal@redhat.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox