Re: [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program

Kees Cook
2015-09-04T20:17:35Z

On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> This commit adds a way to dump eBPF programs. The initial implementation
> doesn't support maps, and therefore only allows dumping seccomp ebpf
> programs which themselves don't currently support maps.
>
> We export the GPL bit as well as a unique ID for the program so that

This unique ID appears to be the heap address for the prog. That's a
huge leak, and should not be done. We don't want to introduce new
kernel address leaks while we're trying to fix the remaining ones.
Shouldn't the "unique ID" be the fd itself? I imagine KCMP_FILE could
be used, for example.

-Kees

> userspace can detect when two seccomp filters were inherited from each
> other and clone the filter tree accordingly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
> CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index 79b825a..c5d8dc2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ enum bpf_cmd {
> * returns fd or negative error
> */
> BPF_PROG_LOAD,
> +
> + /* dump an existing bpf
> + * err = bpf(BPF_PROG_DUMP, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
> + * Using attr->prog_fd, attr->dump_insn_cnt, attr->dump_insns
> + * returns zero or negative error
> + */
> + BPF_PROG_DUMP,
> };
>
> enum bpf_map_type {
> @@ -160,6 +167,14 @@ union bpf_attr {
> __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied buffer */
> __u32 kern_version; /* checked when prog_type=kprobe */
> };
> +
> + struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_PROG_DUMP command */
> + __u32 prog_fd;
> + __u32 dump_insn_cnt;
> + __aligned_u64 dump_insns; /* user supplied buffer */
> + __u8 gpl_compatible;
> + __u64 prog_id; /* unique id for this prog */
> + };
> } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>
> /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index a1b14d1..ee580d0 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -586,6 +586,47 @@ free_prog:
> return err;
> }
>
> +static int bpf_prog_dump(union bpf_attr *attr, union __user bpf_attr *uattr)
> +{
> + int ufd = attr->prog_fd;
> + struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
> + struct bpf_prog *prog;
> + int ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> + prog = get_prog(f);
> + if (IS_ERR(prog))
> + return PTR_ERR(prog);
> +
> + /* For now, let's refuse to dump anything that isn't a seccomp program.
> + * Other program types have support for maps, which our current dump
> + * code doesn't support.
> + */
> + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP)
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (put_user(prog->len, &uattr->dump_insn_cnt))
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (put_user((u8) prog->gpl_compatible, &uattr->gpl_compatible))
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (put_user((u64) prog, &uattr->prog_id))
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (attr->dump_insns) {
> + u32 len = prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(u64_to_ptr(attr->dump_insns),
> + prog->insns, len) != 0)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = 0;
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, size)
> {
> union bpf_attr attr = {};
> @@ -650,6 +691,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz
> case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
> err = bpf_prog_load(&attr);
> break;
> + case BPF_PROG_DUMP:
> + err = bpf_prog_dump(&attr, uattr);
> + break;
> default:
> err = -EINVAL;
> break;
> --
> 2.1.4
>

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security