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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2015 09:50:45 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151003075045.GC25143@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151002080239.GC16538@pd.tnic>


* Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 09:26:44AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > It's better to generate a WARN()ing programmatically if the W+X condition occurs, 
> > that gets noticed by tools and people alike. I'd like to start treating that 
> > condition as a hard kernel bug.
> > 
> > A dump in dmesg is subject to random noise by printk crusaders and is also subject 
> > to general bitrot, nor does it provide any ready warning to act upon.
> 
> You're not going to enable this option in production anyway. [...]

Why not? I'd suggest distros do it too, it's not too much code to run during 
bootup. That way if we one some weird configuration forget about a W+X mapping, 
the distro is warned that there's a security problem.

> > I'd even add this debug check as default-enabled in the x86 defconfigs, so 
> > that my own continuous kernel testing kit picks up any new warnings from it.
> 
> There's the problem with exposing sensitive info in debugfs if you do that. And 
> nowadays we're trying hard not to leak any of that.

Ah, I think you missed the following detail: the patch I suggested would separate 
the debugfs bits from the checking bits and would thus allow a 'security check 
only' .config setting.

Distros would normally not want to enable the debugfs file, agreed about that.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2015-10-03  7:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-01 16:28 [RFC][PATCH] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Stephen Smalley
2015-10-01 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2015-10-01 19:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2015-10-02  7:26     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02  8:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2015-10-03  7:50         ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2015-10-03  9:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2015-10-02  7:37 ` Ingo Molnar

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