Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Basic trusted keys support for TPM 2.0

[Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:11:21AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Basic trusted keys support: auth value and SHA256.
> 
> v2:
> 
> * Removed all the changes that modify the existing functions to use
>   the new struct tpm_buf. These changes should be done separately from
>   this patch set as they require separate QA + review.
> * 'keyhandle=' is now required for TPM2. Makes sense to always state
>   the sealing key because there's no any fixed keys on the chip (thanks
>   to Andreas Fuchs for this comment).
> * I updated tpm_buf to a be heap based structure. Now there's one full
>   page of memory for variable sized messages. Also the stack is greatly
>   reduced.

The basic test that I did was:

ID=$(keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x80000000" @u)
keyctl pipe $ID  > blob.hex
keyctl clear @u
keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat blob.hex` keyhandle=0x80000000" @u
keyctl clear @u

I also checked that the code fails with -EINVAL when keyhandle is not
given.

For generating a sealing key I used tpm2-root-key script from

https://github.com/jsakkine/linux-tpm2

I think the code is in the shape that it is ready to be pulled but some
tested-by's are needed.

> Jarkko Sakkinen (4):
>   tpm: introduce tpm_buf
>   keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.h
>   tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0
>   keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips
> 
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c |  76 ++++++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h           | 110 +++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c      | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  include/keys/trusted-type.h      |  14 ++-
>  include/linux/tpm.h              |  26 ++++
>  security/keys/trusted.c          |  36 +++++-
>  security/keys/trusted.h          |  11 --
>  7 files changed, 507 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.5.0
> 
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