From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756049AbcAMSf0 (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2016 13:35:26 -0500 Received: from lan.nucleusys.com ([92.247.61.126]:55310 "EHLO zztop.nucleusys.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755879AbcAMSfV (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2016 13:35:21 -0500 Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:35:19 +0200 From: Petko Manolov To: David Howells Cc: Mimi Zohar , James Morris , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mdb@juniper.net Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring Message-ID: <20160113183519.GC7826@localhost> Mail-Followup-To: David Howells , Mimi Zohar , James Morris , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mdb@juniper.net References: <1452432410.2651.40.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20160106134525.15633.73582.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <24185.1452126854@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1452180676.2890.21.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <2033.1452447990@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <30355.1452562693@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <30974.1452618524@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20160113163148.GA32533@bender.nucleusys.com> <28539.1452709150@warthog.procyon.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <28539.1452709150@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam detection software, running on the system "zztop.nucleusys.com", has NOT identified this incoming email as spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote: > Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > I beg to differ. The IMA model is not broken with the current patches > > being upstreamed. The basic concepts developed will continue to be > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA. > > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it > reverting or removing. It affects module signing too. [...] Content analysis details: (-1.0 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote: > Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > I beg to differ. The IMA model is not broken with the current patches > > being upstreamed. The basic concepts developed will continue to be > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA. > > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it > reverting or removing. It affects module signing too. The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted. This could easily be fixed. Some users do want to be able to load kernel modules signed by other trusted parties. Think of .ima_mok as system wide keyring in this case. It is semantically broken, but it does the right thing. Petko