From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: fs: NULL deref in atime_needs_update
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2016 17:10:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160220171044.GH17997@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <56C86954.6030101@digikod.net>
On Sat, Feb 20, 2016 at 02:25:40PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> I think the bug may be somewhere in the nd->depth handling (when its value is 0) in fs/namei.c:get_link(): struct saved *last = nd->stack + nd->depth - 1
Getting there with nd->depth == 0 would certainly be a bug - it would mean
that we got there without should_follow_link() having returned 1.
In case of open() it would be "do_last() has returned positive without
should_follow_link() having returned 1".
<looks>
OK, there are several places where we rely on not getting bogus return values
- inode_permission() should not return positives, neither should vfs_open(),
security_path_truncate() and notify_change().
Other similar "handle the last component" functions are guaranteed to
never return positives other than directly from should_follow_link(), so
they are OK.
IIRC, you used LSM to inject a positive value to inode_permission(), right?
Another way to trigger that would've been ->open() returning positive -
a bug on *anything* since ->open() had been introduced in 0.95. Amount of
harm would vary - e.g. 0.95 would simply have that positive number returned
to userland, looking like successful open(2). With no new descriptor, of
course...
Short-term we probably want just
if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
WARN_ON(1);
error = -EINVAL;
}
added right after out: in do_last(), try to trigger Dmitry's reproducers
on it and then work back to the source of that thing *if* that's what's
happening in his case. Yours almost certainly is just that.
Longer-term... I'm not sure. Having a method that is supposed to return 0
or -E<something> actually return positive is going to be a bad thing, no
matter what, but "that bogus value gets passed to userland" is a lot
more tolerable than "kernel memory corruption". do_last() calling conventions
make it vulnerable to the latter, and as far as nd->stack underruns that's
it, but I'm not sure we don't have other places where such bug in driver,
etc. would translate into mess ;-/
OK, in any case, let's start with checking if Dmitry is seeing that and not
something else. I still don't understand his stack traces - the fault
address quoted in his first posting doesn't match the register values in
the same trace, and there's also a possibility that it's an RCU-related
crap. This should give a warning and prevent an oops if we are hitting
a stack underrun on bogus positive from do_last(). Dmitry, could you try
to build with delta below and run your reproducer(s)?
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index f624d13..e30deef 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3273,6 +3273,10 @@ opened:
goto exit_fput;
}
out:
+ if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ }
if (got_write)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
path_put(&save_parent);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-02-20 17:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-05 21:11 fs: NULL deref in atime_needs_update Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-16 23:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-02-19 19:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-20 3:21 ` Al Viro
2016-02-20 3:54 ` Al Viro
2016-02-20 13:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-02-20 17:10 ` Al Viro [this message]
2016-02-20 20:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-02-20 20:50 ` Al Viro
2016-02-22 11:20 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-22 17:23 ` Al Viro
2016-02-23 15:34 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-23 18:17 ` Al Viro
2016-02-20 10:36 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-24 3:12 ` Ian Kent
2016-02-24 4:46 ` Al Viro
2016-02-24 10:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-24 10:15 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-24 13:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-24 15:15 ` Al Viro
2016-02-25 8:29 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-25 16:39 ` Al Viro
2016-02-26 21:21 ` Al Viro
2016-02-26 21:25 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-26 22:07 ` Al Viro
2016-02-27 22:27 ` Al Viro
2016-02-28 15:43 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-28 16:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-28 17:01 ` Al Viro
2016-02-28 20:01 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 9:38 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-29 12:34 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-29 16:11 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 13:09 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 15:54 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-29 16:19 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 18:19 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-03-01 8:59 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2016-02-29 16:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-02-29 16:50 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 17:20 ` Al Viro
2016-02-29 17:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-02-29 13:43 ` David Howells
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