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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Stephane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: Thoughts on tightening up user namespace creation
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 13:21:03 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160309192103.GA2523@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1457549467.650797.544465346.49653120@webmail.messagingengine.com>

Quoting Colin Walters (walters@verbum.org):
> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016, at 01:14 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 9:15 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> > > Hi all-
> > >
> > > There are several users and distros that are nervous about user
> > > namespaces from an attack surface point of view.
> > >
> > >  - RHEL and Arch have userns disabled.
> > >
> > >  - Ubuntu requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> > >
> > >  - Kees periodically proposes to upstream some sysctl to control
> > > userns creation.
> > 
> > And here's another ring0 escalation flaw, made available to
> > unprivileged users because of userns:
> > 
> > https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=758
> 
> Looks like Andy won't have to eat his hat ;)
> 
> > The change in attack surface is _substantial_. We must have a way to
> > globally disable userns.
> 
> No one would object if it was enabled but only accessible to
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN though, right?  This could be useful for 

I think that would be terrible.  I'd have to expose all of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
to allow use of CLONE_NEWUSER.  I'd be more interested in a new CAP_NEWUSER
capability.  Then systems wanting to support unprivileged users doing user
namespaces could set a pam module giving certain users that cap in pI, and
set it on fI on their container managers.  Userspace has to give access to
mapped uids through /etc/subuid too, so it's not *so* huge added hurdle.
Well that's not quite true - with empty subuid, users can create a userns
with no mapped userids which in itself is useful for sandboxing.

The biggest problem with a CAP_NEWUSER would be that it's more inherently
permanent than a new sysctl.  The increase in attack surface is real, but
over time I'd like to think that we will have dealt with it and should be
able to make CLONE_NEWUSER unprivileged.  Because what we have is an
implementation issue (not in user namespaces), not a design issue.

And I do agree the issue is real.

-serge

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-09 19:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-08  5:15 Thoughts on tightening up user namespace creation Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-08  6:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-03-08 18:31   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-08 22:41     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-03-08 10:05 ` Alexander Larsson
2016-03-08 16:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-09 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-09 18:51   ` Colin Walters
2016-03-09 19:04     ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-03-09 19:21     ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2016-03-09 19:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-03-09 19:07   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-03-09 19:12     ` Kees Cook

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