From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
lasse.collin@tukaani.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 19/20] x86, kaslr: Allow random address to be below loaded address
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 09:41:49 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160323014149.GA4048@x1.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLvP15dVrF3CNwb09RaxE1ZV6+QQv9utX5DmNpebS8FDQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 03/22/16 at 12:54pm, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 12:32 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> >
> > Now new randomized output can only be chosen from regions above loaded
> > address. In this case, for bootloaders like kexec which always loads
> > kernel near the end of ram, it doesn't do randomization at all. Or kernel
> > is loaded in a very big starting address, we should not give up that area
> > is loaded in a very large address, then the area below the large loaded
> > address will be given up. This is not reasonable.
> >
> > With correct tracking in mem_avoid we can allow random output below
> > loaded address. With this change, though kexec can get random ouput
> > below its loaded address of kernel.
> >
> > Now we just pick 512M as min_addr. If kernel loaded address is bigger than
> > 512M, E.g 8G. Then [512M, 8G) can be added into random output candidate area.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 10 ++++++++--
> > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> > index ddfc3d0..d072ca7 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
> > @@ -446,7 +446,8 @@ void choose_kernel_location(unsigned char *input,
> > unsigned long output_size,
> > unsigned char **virt_offset)
> > {
> > - unsigned long random;
> > + unsigned long random, min_addr;
> > +
> > *virt_offset = (unsigned char *)LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR;
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
> > @@ -467,8 +468,13 @@ void choose_kernel_location(unsigned char *input,
> > mem_avoid_init((unsigned long)input, input_size,
> > (unsigned long)*output);
> >
> > + /* start from 512M */
> > + min_addr = (unsigned long)*output;
> > + if (min_addr > (512UL<<20))
> > + min_addr = 512UL<<20;
>
> The goal is to find a minimum address? I'm not sure this comment makes
> sense. Shouldn't this be:
>
> /* Lower minimum to 512M. */
> min_addr = min_t(unsigned long, *output, 512UL << 20);
>
> Or something like that?
Yes, the goal is to lower minimum to 512M. It's better to change it to
"Lower minimum to 512M" as you suggested. I will resend a new one with
this update into this thread.
Thanks a lot for your great suggestion for patch log, code change and
patch rearranging, and also appreciate your encouragement and patience.
Thanks
Baoquan
>
> > +
> > /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> > - random = find_random_phy_addr((unsigned long)*output, output_size);
> > + random = find_random_phy_addr(min_addr, output_size);
> > if (!random)
> > debug_putstr("KASLR could not find suitable E820 region...\n");
> > else {
> > --
> > 2.5.0
> >
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-23 1:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-22 7:31 [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:31 ` [PATCH v4 01/20] x86, kaslr: Remove not needed parameter for choose_kernel_location Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:31 ` [PATCH v4 02/20] x86, kaslr: Fix a bug that relocation can not be handled when kernel is loaded above 2G Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 03/20] x86, boot: Move compressed kernel to end of buffer before decompressing Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 04/20] x86, boot: Move z_extract_offset calculation to header.S Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 05/20] x86, kaskr: Update the description for decompressor worst case Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 06/20] x86, boot: Fix run_size calculation Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 07/20] x86, kaslr: Clean up useless code related to run_size Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 08/20] x86, kaslr: Get correct max_addr for relocs pointer Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 09/20] x86, kaslr: Consolidate mem_avoid array filling Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 10/20] x86, boot: Split kernel_ident_mapping_init to another file Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 11/20] x86, 64bit: Set ident_mapping for kaslr Baoquan He
2016-04-13 10:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 12/20] x86, boot: Add checking for memcpy Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 13/20] x86, kaslr: Introduce struct slot_area to manage randomization slot info Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 14/20] x86, kaslr: Add two functions which will be used later Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 15/20] x86, kaslr: Introduce fetch_random_virt_offset to randomize the kernel text mapping address Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 16/20] x86, kaslr: Randomize physical and virtual address of kernel separately Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 17/20] x86, kaslr: Add support of kernel physical address randomization above 4G Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 18/20] x86, kaslr: Remove useless codes Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 19/20] x86, kaslr: Allow random address to be below loaded address Baoquan He
2016-03-22 19:54 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-23 1:41 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2016-03-23 8:59 ` [PATCH v5 " Baoquan He
2016-03-22 7:32 ` [PATCH v4 20/20] x86, kaslr: Use KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as the offset max for kernel virtual randomization Baoquan He
2016-03-22 20:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-03-22 20:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support Kees Cook
2016-03-23 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-05 1:56 ` Baoquan He
2016-04-05 20:00 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-13 10:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-04-13 14:11 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-14 6:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-14 6:24 ` Baoquan He
2016-04-14 15:06 ` Baoquan He
2016-04-14 17:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-15 4:08 ` Baoquan He
2016-04-15 4:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-15 6:55 ` Ingo Molnar
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