From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2016 19:45:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160423184501.GM3348@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160423184421.GL3348@decadent.org.uk>
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Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else. Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 66426f743c29..649b1827ed15 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2599,13 +2599,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
int err = -ENOKEY;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
- if (info->len > markerlen &&
+ /*
+ * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+ */
+ if (flags == 0 &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2624,7 +2629,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3386,7 +3391,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
long err;
char *after_dashes;
- err = module_sig_check(info);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-23 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-23 18:44 [PATCH 0/3] Module signing and version info Ben Hutchings
2016-04-23 18:45 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2016-04-26 10:37 ` [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Rusty Russell
2016-04-26 21:00 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-04-27 23:54 ` Rusty Russell
2016-04-23 18:45 ` [PATCH 2/3] Documentation/module-signing.txt: Note need for version info if reusing a key Ben Hutchings
2016-04-23 18:45 ` [PATCH 3/3] module: Disable MODULE_FORCE_LOAD when MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled Ben Hutchings
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