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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 5/5] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 10:47:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160617084751.GB4791@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>


* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> 
> Currently the physical randomization's lower boundary is the original
> kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high
> memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small
> window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory
> below the load address.
> 
> Since mem_avoid is already correctly tracking the regions that must be
> avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less:
> 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the
> load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M,
> 8G) will be added into possible physical memory positions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> [kees: rewrote changelog, refactor to use min()]
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 7 +++++--
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> index d0a823df183b..304c5c369aff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
>  			    unsigned long output_size,
>  			    unsigned long *virt_addr)
>  {
> -	unsigned long random_addr;
> +	unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
>  
>  	/* By default, keep output position unchanged. */
>  	*virt_addr = *output;
> @@ -517,8 +517,11 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
>  	/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
>  	mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
>  
> +	/* Low end should be the smaller of 512M or initial location. */
> +	min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
> +
>  	/* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> -	random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(*output, output_size);
> +	random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
>  	if (!random_addr) {
>  		warn("KASLR disabled: could not find suitable E820 region!");
>  	} else {

There's no explanation in the code or in the changelog of why 512M was picked as 
the lower limit.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2016-06-17  8:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-05-25 22:45 [PATCH v9 0/5] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 1/5] x86/boot: Refuse to build with data relocations Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:22   ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:01   ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 2/5] x86/KASLR: Clarify identity map interface Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:22   ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:02   ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 3/5] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-06-17  8:20   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-17  8:35     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-17 12:22   ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Baoquan He
2016-06-26 11:02   ` tip-bot for Baoquan He
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 4/5] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:23   ` [tip:x86/boot] x86/KASLR: Extend kernel image physical address randomization to addresses larger than 4G tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:02   ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 5/5] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address Kees Cook
2016-06-17  8:47   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2016-06-17 15:44     ` Kees Cook
2016-06-17 18:44       ` Yinghai Lu
2016-06-17 12:23   ` [tip:x86/boot] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the " tip-bot for Yinghai Lu
2016-06-26 11:03   ` tip-bot for Yinghai Lu

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