From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 5/5] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 10:47:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160617084751.GB4791@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
>
> Currently the physical randomization's lower boundary is the original
> kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high
> memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small
> window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory
> below the load address.
>
> Since mem_avoid is already correctly tracking the regions that must be
> avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less:
> 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the
> load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M,
> 8G) will be added into possible physical memory positions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
> [kees: rewrote changelog, refactor to use min()]
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 7 +++++--
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> index d0a823df183b..304c5c369aff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
> unsigned long output_size,
> unsigned long *virt_addr)
> {
> - unsigned long random_addr;
> + unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
>
> /* By default, keep output position unchanged. */
> *virt_addr = *output;
> @@ -517,8 +517,11 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
> /* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
> mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
>
> + /* Low end should be the smaller of 512M or initial location. */
> + min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
> +
> /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> - random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(*output, output_size);
> + random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
> if (!random_addr) {
> warn("KASLR disabled: could not find suitable E820 region!");
> } else {
There's no explanation in the code or in the changelog of why 512M was picked as
the lower limit.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-17 8:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-25 22:45 [PATCH v9 0/5] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 1/5] x86/boot: Refuse to build with data relocations Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:22 ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:01 ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 2/5] x86/KASLR: Clarify identity map interface Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:22 ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:02 ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 3/5] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-06-17 8:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-17 8:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-06-17 12:22 ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Baoquan He
2016-06-26 11:02 ` tip-bot for Baoquan He
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 4/5] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G Kees Cook
2016-06-17 12:23 ` [tip:x86/boot] x86/KASLR: Extend kernel image physical address randomization to addresses larger than 4G tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-06-26 11:02 ` tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-25 22:45 ` [PATCH v9 5/5] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address Kees Cook
2016-06-17 8:47 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2016-06-17 15:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-17 18:44 ` Yinghai Lu
2016-06-17 12:23 ` [tip:x86/boot] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the " tip-bot for Yinghai Lu
2016-06-26 11:03 ` tip-bot for Yinghai Lu
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