From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwalsh@redhat.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, pmoore@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 16:42:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160705204235.GE17987@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <63906f0e-25cf-266b-6df9-18317f1e7c59@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 12:36:17PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> On 7/5/2016 8:50 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
> > up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
> >
> > This hook can prepare and switch to a new set of creds which are suitable
> > for new file creation during copy up. Caller should revert to old creds
> > after file creation.
> >
> > In SELinux, newly copied up file gets same label as lower file for
> > non-context mounts. But it gets label specified in mount option context=
> > for context mounts.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 8 ++++++++
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +++++++++++++
> > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
> > security/security.c | 8 ++++++++
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > index 80aa6f1..90dc362 100644
> > --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
> > struct dentry *upper = NULL;
> > umode_t mode = stat->mode;
> > int err;
> > + const struct cred *old_creds = NULL;
> >
> > newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
> > err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
> > @@ -258,10 +259,17 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
> > if (IS_ERR(upper))
> > goto out1;
> >
> > + err = security_inode_copy_up(dentry, &old_creds);
> > + if (err < 0)
> > + goto out2;
> > +
> > /* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
> > stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
> > err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
> > stat->mode = mode;
> > + if (old_creds)
> > + revert_creds(old_creds);
> > +
> > if (err)
> > goto out2;
>
> I don't much care for the way part of the credential manipulation
> is done in the caller and part is done the the security module.
> If the caller is going to restore the old state, the caller should
> save the old state.
Ok, I am fine either way. Smalley had preferred switching creds in
security module, that's why I did it this way. I will change back
to allocating and overriding creds in caller.
>
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 7ae3976..fcde9b9 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -401,6 +401,17 @@
> > * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
> > * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
> > * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> > + * @inode_copy_up:
> > + * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
> > + * overlay filesystem. Prepare a new set of creds and set file creation
> > + * secid in such a way so that copied up file gets the appropriate
>
> The details of what goes on the the SELinux case don't belong here.
Ok, will remove selinux specific details from here.
Thanks
Vivek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-05 20:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-07 20:33 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08 7:21 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 4:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 7:06 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160705204235.GE17987@redhat.com \
--to=vgoyal@redhat.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=dwalsh@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=pmoore@redhat.com \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).