From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwalsh@redhat.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, pmoore@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:09:21 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160705210921.GF17987@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7669deeb-12db-deeb-abd2-1743acf3721b@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 01:25:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/5/2016 8:50 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
> > current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
> > from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
> > where to fetch security pointer from.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index c68223c..86a07ed 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -1785,13 +1785,13 @@ out:
> > /*
> > * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
> > */
> > -static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
> > - const struct qstr *name,
> > - u16 tclass,
> > +static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const void *security,
>
> You know the type. Why not use it?
>
> static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
Will change it. All callers use current_security() to fetch this pointer
and it returns void * and I guess I assumed that compiler will complain
but it does not seem to complain.
Vivek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-05 21:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 20:33 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08 7:21 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 4:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 7:06 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28 ` Casey Schaufler
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