From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwalsh@redhat.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, pmoore@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:15:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160705211502.GG17987@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bc7c8147-465e-791d-ce5a-1a194eb67228@schaufler-ca.com>
On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 01:22:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/5/2016 8:50 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
> > copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and one can either
> > accept or reject xattr. If 0 is returned, xattr will be copied up, if 1
> > is returned, xattr will not be copied up and if negative error code
> > is returned, copy up will be aborted.
> >
> > In SELinux, label of lower file is not copied up. File already has been
> > set with right label at the time of creation and we don't want to overwrite
> > that label.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 8 ++++++++
> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +++++++++++++
> > include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++
> > security/security.c | 9 +++++++++
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> > 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > index 90dc362..2c31938 100644
> > --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> > @@ -103,6 +103,14 @@ retry:
> > goto retry;
> > }
> >
> > + error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(old, new,
> > + name, value, size);
> > + if (error < 0)
> > + break;
> > + if (error == 1) {
> > + error = 0;
> > + continue; /* Discard */
> > + }
> > error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
> > if (error)
> > break;
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index fcde9b9..2a8ee8c 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -412,6 +412,16 @@
> > * @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up.
> > * @old indicates the pointer to old_cred returned to caller.
> > * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
> > + * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
> > + * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied
> > + * up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
> > + * @src indicates the file that is being copied up.
> > + * @dst indicates the file that has being created by the copy up.
> > + * @name indicates the name of the xattr.
> > + * @value, @size indicate the payload of the xattr.
> > + * Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr or a negative
> > + * error code to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible
> > + * for reading and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
>
> The return should be -EOPNOTSUPP from security modules that don't
> support the attribute "name". This will make it possible to support
> multiple modules that provide attributes. (patches pending)
Hmm.., Sorry I did not understand this one.
So all modules will not understand all xattrs. So if they start returning
-EOPNOTSUPP, then as per current implementation, copy up operation will
be aborted.
Current implementation relies on that a security module, returns 0 if
every thing is "name" xattr should be copied up or lsm does not care.
Negative error code is returned only if something is wrong. Given every
lsm will not understand/care about all the xattrs, we can't return
error code if lsm does not own/understand the "name". In fact
call_int_hook() will bail out the very first time negative error code
is returned.
IOW, current implementation will work with multiple modules providing
implementation for same hook as long as module returns 0 for the xattrs
it does not understand.
I guess I am missing something. Can you please elaborate a little more.
>
> If the only use to which this hook is put is to identify attributes
> that should be discarded it's unnecessary overhead to pass the
> parameters that are never used.
Ok, I will get rid of extra parameters. If somebody needs these, it can
be added later.
Vivek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-05 21:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20 ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 20:33 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08 7:21 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-05 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 4:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 7:06 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160705211502.GG17987@redhat.com \
--to=vgoyal@redhat.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=dwalsh@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=pmoore@redhat.com \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).