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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwalsh@redhat.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2016 17:53:13 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160705215313.GJ17987@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGH-KgvOe9ysM8FaUEPb4kSw6yYD_iQwRKLmbM2xX0YKZ2Xx8A@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Jul 05, 2016 at 05:45:25PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 5, 2016 at 11:50 AM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
> > copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and one can either
> > accept or reject xattr. If 0 is returned, xattr will be copied up, if 1
> > is returned, xattr will not be copied up and if negative error code
> > is returned, copy up will be aborted.
> >
> > In SELinux, label of lower file is not copied up. File already has been
> > set with right label at the time of creation and we don't want to overwrite
> > that label.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c    |  8 ++++++++
> >  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +++++++++++++
> >  include/linux/security.h  | 10 ++++++++++
> >  security/security.c       |  9 +++++++++
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c  | 14 ++++++++++++++
> >  5 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
> 
> To continue the earlier feedback about mixing generic LSM hook
> definitions with the SELinux specific hook implementations - I prefer
> to see patchsets organized in the following manner:
> 
> [PATCH 1/X] - add new LSM hooks and the calls from the relevant
> subsystems, e.g.
> {security/security.c,include/linux/security.h,fs/overlayfs/*}
> [PATCH 2/X] - LSM specific hook implementation, e.g. security/selinux/*
> [PATCH n/X] - LSM specific hook implementation, e.g. security/smack/*

Ok, will do this way.

Vivek

  reply	other threads:[~2016-07-05 21:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-05 15:50 [PATCH 0/5][RFC] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 1/5] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 16:53   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 17:43     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 17:20   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-05 19:36   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 20:42     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 20:33     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-07 21:44       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-08  7:21         ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 12:45           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 13:42             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 15:34               ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:35   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:52     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 22:03       ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 2/5] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:22   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:15     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 21:34       ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-06 17:09         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 17:50           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:01           ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 19:22             ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:45   ` Paul Moore
2016-07-05 21:53     ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 3/5] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:09     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 4/5] overlayfs: Correctly label newly created file over whiteout Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 15:50 ` [PATCH 5/5] overlayfs: Use vfs_getxattr_noperm() for real inode Vivek Goyal
2016-07-05 20:29   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-07-05 21:16     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06  4:36       ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-06 10:54         ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-06 14:58           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-07 18:35             ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08  7:06               ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-08 15:28                 ` Casey Schaufler

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