From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:27:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161031082705.GA2863@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161028140522.GH5806@leverpostej>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1917 bytes --]
Hi!
> On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 01:21:36PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > Has this been tested on a system vulnerable to rowhammer, and if so, was
> > > it reliable in mitigating the issue?
> > >
> > > Which particular attack codebase was it tested against?
> >
> > I have rowhammer-test here,
> >
> > commit 9824453fff76e0a3f5d1ac8200bc6c447c4fff57
> > Author: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
>
> ... from which repo?
>
> > I do not have vulnerable machine near me, so no "real" tests, but
> > I'm pretty sure it will make the error no longer reproducible with the
> > newer version. [Help welcome ;-)]
>
> Even if we hope this works, I think we have to be very careful with that
> kind of assertion. Until we have data is to its efficacy, I don't think
> we should claim that this is an effective mitigation.
Ok, so it turns out I was right. On my vulnerable machine, normally
bug is reproducible in less than 500 iterations:
Iteration 432 (after 1013.31s)
error at 0xda7cf280: got 0xffffffffffffffef
Iteration 446 (after 1102.56s)
error at 0xec21ea00: got 0xffffffefffffffff
Iteration 206 (after 497.50s)
error at 0xd07d1438: got 0xffffffffffffffdf
Iteration 409 (after 1350.96s)
error at 0xbd3b9108: got 0xefffffffffffffff
Iteration 120 (after 326.08s)
error at 0xe398c438: got 0xffffffffffffffdf
With nohammer, I'm at 2300 iterations, and still no faults.
Daniel Gruss <daniel@gruss.cc> claims he has an attack that can do 30
flips a second on modern hardware. I'm not going to buy broken
hardware just for a test. Code is at
https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs/tree/master/native . Would someone
be willing to get it running on vulnerable machine and test kernel
patches?
Thanks,
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
[-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 181 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-31 8:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-26 20:54 Getting interrupt every million cache misses Pavel Machek
2016-10-27 8:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27 8:46 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27 9:11 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-27 9:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-27 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 21:27 ` rowhammer protection [was Re: Getting interrupt every million cache misses] Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 7:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28 8:50 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 8:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28 11:55 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 9:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28 9:27 ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28 9:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-10-28 9:47 ` Vegard Nossum
2016-10-28 9:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:27 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 9:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 11:21 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 14:05 ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-28 14:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-28 18:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 18:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-02 18:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-28 17:27 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 13:06 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 19:42 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 20:05 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:05 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:07 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 21:45 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 21:49 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-29 22:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-29 22:02 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-10-31 8:27 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2016-10-31 14:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-31 21:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-31 22:09 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-01 6:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-01 7:20 ` Daniel Micay
2016-11-01 7:53 ` Daniel Gruss
2016-11-01 8:10 ` Pavel Machek
2016-11-01 8:13 ` Daniel Gruss
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20161031082705.GA2863@amd \
--to=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=acme@redhat.com \
--cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).