From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933400AbcKCVkr (ORCPT ); Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:40:47 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f177.google.com ([209.85.192.177]:36822 "EHLO mail-pf0-f177.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933237AbcKCVko (ORCPT ); Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:40:44 -0400 Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 14:40:41 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Andrew Morton Cc: Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Vlastimil Babka , Michal Hocko , Konstantin Khlebnikov , Hugh Dickins , Naoya Horiguchi , Rodrigo Freire , John Stultz , Ross Zwisler , Robert Ho , Jerome Marchand , Andy Lutomirski , Johannes Weiner , Alexey Dobriyan , "Richard W.M. Jones" , Joe Perches , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] proc: Report no_new_privs state Message-ID: <20161103214041.GA58566@beast> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly confined with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting, so this adds it to /proc/$pid/status. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 2 ++ fs/proc/array.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt index 74329fd0add2..c03f2f91c6ab 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status: CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff + NoNewPrivs: 0 Seccomp: 0 voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0 nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1 @@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 4.1) CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set + NoNewPrivs no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...) Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...) Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format" diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 81818adb8e9e..082676ab4878 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) { + seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p)); #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP - seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode); - seq_putc(m, '\n'); + seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode); #endif + seq_putc(m, '\n'); } static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m, -- 2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Nexus Security