From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 11:10:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123101050.GA2113@wunner.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <31281.1479894780@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 09:53:00AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:
> > It just occurred to me that the boot_params struct is populated in
> > make_boot_params(), perhaps it makes sense to move this line there.
> > Otherwise LGTM.
>
> Ummm... Looking at arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S, make_boot_params() is
> only called if the stub is entered through efi_pe_entry, not if entered
> through efi64_stub_entry, whereas efi_main() is called in both cases. I think
> entry through efi32_stub_entry may also skip make_boot_params().
>
> The comment on make_boot_params() suggests that this function is only used if
> whoever booted the kernel didn't supply it.
Good point. :-) I didn't dig this deep, it was just something that
crossed my mind when skimming over the patch.
You're also right about the (efi_##f##_t *) addition in patch 2.
Thanks,
Lukas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 10:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner [this message]
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
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