From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: lukas@wunner.de, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:27:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123102747.GD24624@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147986056324.13790.12670822944798392730.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Hi,
Any reason to not Cc LAKML?
On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 12:22:43AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Provide the ability to perform mixed-mode runtime service calls for arm in
> the same way that commit 0a637ee61247bd4bed9b2a07568ef7a1cfc76187
> ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") provides the
> ability to invoke arbitrary boot services.
I'm not sure I understand. On arm/arm64, "mixed-mode" simply isn't possible.
I see we already call runtime services directly in efi_get_secureboot()
in drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c.
If this is just to provide a consistent API for the stub, please note
that.
> Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
> index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
> @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
>
> #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
> #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
> +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
> #define efi_is_64bit() (false)
>
> #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
> index 771b3f0bc757..d74ae223d89f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
> @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
>
> #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
> #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__)
> +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
Given this can only work in the stub, the name is somewhat unfortunate,
as it sounds like it's expected to be used at runtime (i.e. in the
kernel). But I guess that's not a big problem.
Other than the casting issue you noted, I think this should work,
though.
Thanks,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 10:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
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