From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe"
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 11:48:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161220104846.GA18702@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LSU.2.20.1612201129320.19203@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
On Tue, Dec 20, 2016 at 11:31:57AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Dec 2016, Jiri Kosina wrote:
>
> > I stay totally unconvinced that such kind of countermeasure brings any
> > value whatsoever. Could you please bring up a particular usecase, where
> > you have complete control over kernel memory, and still the only
> > possible exploit factor is redirecting usermodhelper? It feels like
> > rather random shot into darkness.
>
> If we want to make usermod helper really secure, perhaps the best way to
> go would be to completely nuke it and handle everyhting in udev; that'd be
> quite some work though, especially so that we don't break all the corner
> cases of module autoloading (request_module() and such).
In talking about this with others, I like Neil's approach of just
calling out to a statically-defined single binary to handle all of the
specifics. Using something like busybox/toybox to handle any usermode
helper issues would be a very simple way to deal with this on a large
number of systems (i.e. embedded devices / phones / chromebooks).
After I return from vacation, I'll respin this series based on that idea
and repost it.
thanks,
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-20 10:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-14 18:50 [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [PATCH 1/4] kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [PATCH 2/4] drbd: rename "usermode_helper" to "drbd_usermode_helper" Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [PATCH 3/4] Make static usermode helper binaries constant Greg KH
2016-12-14 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-14 20:29 ` Rich Felker
2016-12-14 20:54 ` Greg KH
2016-12-15 17:54 ` Greg KH
2016-12-15 20:51 ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-15 21:18 ` Greg KH
2016-12-16 0:05 ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-16 0:14 ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-14 18:51 ` [RFC 4/4] Introduce CONFIG_READONLY_USERMODEHELPER Greg KH
2016-12-14 20:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-12-14 20:57 ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 19:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Mark Rutland
2016-12-14 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-12-14 21:28 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-14 23:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2016-12-16 1:02 ` NeilBrown
2016-12-16 12:49 ` Greg KH
2016-12-19 13:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 9:27 ` Greg KH
2016-12-20 10:27 ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:31 ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:48 ` Greg KH [this message]
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