Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1003

Will Deacon
2017-01-12T16:07:35Z

On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 03:55:58PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 06:22:08PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > On 11/01/17 18:06, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 09:41:15AM -0500, Christopher Covington wrote:
> > >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
> > >> index 32682be..9ee46df 100644
> > >> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
> > >> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S
> > >> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> > >> #include <asm/assembler.h>
> > >> #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
> > >> #include <asm/hwcap.h>
> > >> +#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> > >> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> > >> #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
> > >> #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> > >> @@ -140,6 +141,18 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_do_resume)
> > >> ENTRY(cpu_do_switch_mm)
> > >> mmid x1, x1 // get mm->context.id
> > >> bfi x0, x1, #48, #16 // set the ASID
> > >> +#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
> > >> +alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
> > >> + mrs x2, ttbr0_el1
> > >> + mov x3, #FALKOR_RESERVED_ASID
> > >> + bfi x2, x3, #48, #16 // reserved ASID + old BADDR
> > >> + msr ttbr0_el1, x2
> > >> + isb
> > >> + bfi x2, x0, #0, #48 // reserved ASID + new BADDR
> > >> + msr ttbr0_el1, x2
> > >> + isb
> > >> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> > >> +#endif
> > >> msr ttbr0_el1, x0 // set TTBR0
> > >> isb
> > >> post_ttbr0_update_workaround
> > >
> > > Please move the above hunk to a pre_ttbr0_update_workaround macro for
> > > consistency with post_ttbr0_update_workaround.
> >
> > In which case (and also for consistency), should we add that pre_ttbr0
> > macro to entry.S, just before __uaccess_ttbr0_enable? It may not be
> > needed in the SW pan case, but it is probably worth entertaining the
> > idea that there may be something to do there...
>
> It may actually be needed in entry.S as well. With SW PAN, we move the
> context switching from cpu_do_switch_mm to the kernel_exit macro when
> returning to user. In this case we are switching from the reserved ASID
> 0 and reserved TTBR0_EL1 (pointing to a zeroed page) to the user's
> TTBR0_EL1 and ASID. If the ASID switch isn't taken into account, we may
> end up with new TLB entries being tagged with the reserved ASID. Apart
> from a potential loss of protection with TTBR0 PAN, is there anything
> else that could go wrong? Maybe a TLB conflict if we mix TLBs from
> multiple address spaces tagged with the same reserved ASID.
>
> If the above is an issue, we would need to patch
> __uaccess_ttbr0_enable() as well, though I'm more inclined to make this
> erratum not selectable when TTBR0 PAN is enabled.

I don't think that's a reasonable approach. By all means change the
default, but we need to support kernel images with both of these kconfig
options enabled.

Will