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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
	Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>, Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 17:26:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170117162627.GA9186@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1484670023.2886.10.camel@poochiereds.net>

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:20:23AM -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-01-16 at 17:50 +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > 
> > Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while
> > others can be changed at runtime.  To provide a sane way to filter these, add a
> > new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER".  This option routes all
> > call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller
> > wishes to have called.
> > 
> > The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed
> > through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the
> > requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument
> > that is passed to it.  All other options should then be passed onto the proper
> > program if so desired.
> > 
> > To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set
> > STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
> > 
> > Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature.
> > 
> > Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > ---
> >  kernel/kmod.c    | 14 ++++++++++++++
> >  security/Kconfig | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
> > index 426a614e97fe..0c407f905ca4 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kmod.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kmod.c
> > @@ -528,7 +528,12 @@ struct subprocess_info *call_usermodehelper_setup(const char *path, char **argv,
> >  		goto out;
> >  
> >  	INIT_WORK(&sub_info->work, call_usermodehelper_exec_work);
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
> > +	sub_info->path = CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH;
> > +#else
> >  	sub_info->path = path;
> > +#endif
> >  	sub_info->argv = argv;
> >  	sub_info->envp = envp;
> >  
> > @@ -566,6 +571,15 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info, int wait)
> >  		retval = -EBUSY;
> >  		goto out;
> >  	}
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * If there is no binary for us to call, then just return and get out of
> > +	 * here.  This allows us to set STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to "" and
> > +	 * disable all call_usermodehelper() calls.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (strlen(sub_info->path) == 0)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> >  	/*
> >  	 * Set the completion pointer only if there is a waiter.
> >  	 * This makes it possible to use umh_complete to free
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 118f4549404e..d900f47eaa68 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -158,6 +158,41 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
> >  	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
> >  	  trying to find such users.
> >  
> > +config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
> > +	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
> > +	help
> > +	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
> > +	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
> > +	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
> > +	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
> > +	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
> > +	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
> > +	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
> > +	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
> > +	  changed.
> > +
> > +	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
> > +	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
> > +	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
> > +	  and choose what real programs are called.
> > +
> > +	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
> > +	  disabled, choose this option and then set
> > +	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
> > +
> > +config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> > +	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
> > +	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
> > +	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
> > +	help
> > +	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
> > +	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
> > +	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
> > +	  line.
> > +
> > +	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> > +	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
> > +
> >  source security/selinux/Kconfig
> >  source security/smack/Kconfig
> >  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
> 
> I like the core of this idea (having a single dispatch binary) a lot. It
> seems like a good way to limit the attack surface. We could even
> consider signing this binary as well, etc...

Or use a read-only partition that is checked with dm-verity at boot so
you know it's safe.  Lots of ways to protect this file.

> I'm less excited though about using the binary pathnames in argv[0].
> Would it be better to pass a non-path string of some sort that the
> binary would have to turn into a path to the binary to exec?

What exactly do you mean by "non-path" string?  You can do whatever you
want with the argv[0] value in your new binary, but rewriting all of the
users of this interface in the kernel to pass in some other type of
value instead of a full path, that doesn't make much sense (hint a path
is just as good as anything else.)

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2017-01-17 16:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-16 16:49 [PATCH 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Greg KH
2017-01-16 16:50 ` [PATCH 1/3] kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string Greg KH
2017-01-16 16:50 ` [PATCH 2/3] Make static usermode helper binaries constant Greg KH
2017-01-16 21:25   ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-01-17  7:13     ` Greg KH
2017-01-17 15:19       ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-01-17 15:29         ` Greg KH
2017-01-19 12:03           ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-01-19 16:27             ` J. Bruce Fields
2017-01-17 15:45   ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-17 15:56     ` Greg KH
2017-01-17 16:07       ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-17 16:12         ` Greg KH
2017-01-16 16:50 ` [PATCH 3/3] Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper() Greg KH
2017-01-17 16:20   ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-17 16:26     ` Greg KH [this message]
2017-01-17 16:52       ` Jeff Layton
2017-01-16 16:51 ` [PATCH 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Greg KH
2017-01-17 17:23 ` Kees Cook

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